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Introduction1
In 2003 the European Union (EU) adopted the Emissions Trading (ET) Directive, which provided 
the legal framework for the establishment of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) in January 
2005. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) was created to curb emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) and materialised as the EU's main policy mechanism designed to mitigate global warming. 
The EU ETS comprises 31 countries, 28 of which are EU Member States—Croatia entered the 
scheme by its accession to the EU on 1 July 20132. In addition, the three  European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) members Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein are also participants. 
The EU ETS sets a cap on emissions of major GHGs and currently covers more than 11,000 power 
stations  and  industrial  plants  as  well  as  aviation;  in  total  it  covers  around  45% of  EU  GHG 
emissions. The central mechanism on which the system relies is that allowances to release GHG 
emissions  carry  a  cost  which  incentivises  emitters  to  cut  emissions.  However,  throughout  the 
lifetime of the EU ETS allowance prices have been chronically low, and this  has rendered the 
system inefficient, because low prices have implied weak incentives to cut emissions. 
In Phase 1 (2005-2007) and in Phase 2 (2008-2012), nearly all allowances were allocated for free,  
and national authorities were responsible for setting national allocation caps, which determined the 
stringency of the scheme. In Phase 1, this lead to over-allocation and a surplus of allowances. In 
Phase 2, the Commission was able to restrict allocations to prevent over-allocation, but the financial 
crisis that escalated in 2008 caused emissions to decrease and thus created a surplus of allowances. 
The EU ETS was revised ahead of Phase 3 (2013-2020). Free allocation to the power generating 
sector was abolished and replaced by auctioning to eliminate the very large windfall profits the 
sector had raked in during Phases 1 and 2. The share of allowances auctioned in 2013 was about 
40%, and this number is set to increase gradually throughout Phase 3. The goal is to auction all 
allowances by 2027.
The EU ETS reform prior to Phase 3 did make significant steps toward enhancing the efficiency of 
the system. Nonetheless, there was a large surplus of allowances in the beginning of Phase 3 which 
1 This section is largely based on information from the European Commission available at 
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets.
2 73 big emitters were however selected by the Croatian government to enter the EU ETS six months earlier, on 1 
January 2013 (2012).
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critically undermined the allowance price, and hence the efficiency of the EU ETS. The surplus is 
projected to persist throughout Phase 3 and spill over into Phase 4, unless measures are taken. The 
surplus was largely created by the financial crisis; but also the ability to transfer allowances from 
Phase 2 to Phase 3; and the oversupply of international emissions allowances.
Despite the general picture that the EU ETS has created relatively weak incentives to cut emissions, 
there is a general consensus in the scientific literature that the EU ETS has caused a modest amount 
of abatement of GHG emissions (Anderson & Di Maria, 2011; Convery, 2009; Delarue, Voorspools, 
& D’haeseleer,  2008;  Ellerman & Buchner,  2008;  Ellerman & Buchner,  2007).  Most  estimates 
agree that in Phase 1, most of the abatement happened in 2005-2006, and reduced emissions in 
Phase 1 by between 2,5 and 5% (Venmans, 2012). Much less research has been conducted on Phase 
2 abatement, but some research indicate that the EU ETS induced more abatement in 2008-2009 
than  in  2005-2006  (Abrell,  Ndoye-Faye,  &  Zachmann,  2011;  Egenhofer,  Alessi,  Georgiev,  & 
Fujiwara, 2011). 
The aim of this paper is to explain why the EU ETS was set up and how it has developed into an 
inefficient  mechanism to  lower  GHG emissions  in  the  member  countries3.  This  paper  is  more 
concerned with flaws that has undermined the scheme's potential to reduce GHGs efficiently than 
GHG reduction targets in Phases 1, 2, and 3. This is firstly because these targets turned out to place 
a relatively low abatement burden on the EU ETS, which appears to be the case also for the Phase 3  
target. Secondly, the targets in these phases are not aligned with the much more demanding targets 
of the 2050 Roadmap that are set out to keep climate change under 2ºC. 
The general approach of this paper is historical. In addition, a political-economy perspective which 
centres on rent-seeking is used to explain certain central aspects of the EU ETS. According to the 
American Economic Association (2012), rent-seeking pertains to microeconomics, and to the sub-
field  of  analysis  of  collective  decision-making.  Rent-seeking  involves  investment  of  resources 
towards creating monopolies. The result of rent-seeking is characterised by a social cost, because it 
produces  unproductive,  yet  politically  feasible  outcomes.  In  other  words,  whereas  the  special 
interests  benefit  from rent-seeking,  the  society as  a  whole  suffers  a  loss  (Tullock,  2008).  This 
perspective is  useful  to  understand certain central aspects of the EU ETS design,  since special 
interests, as this paper will argue, have had a heavy influence on the design of the system and its  
3 In the EU's own words, the EU ETS was established «in order to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in 
a cost-effective and economically efficient manner» (European Parliament and the Council, 2003, p. 32). 
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distributional impacts. Thus the political economy initially shaped the EU ETS in a manner that 
made it perform inefficiently; and indeed in a manner that can appear prima facie counter-intuitive. 
The extensive use of free allocation is a notable example.
This  paper  makes  use  of  both  primary  and  secondary  sources.  Official  EU  documents  and 
publications were the principal sources of technical information about the EU ETS, but also upon 
which part of the narration of historical developments was based. Secondary sources were consulted 
throughout the process of writing this paper, and the academic literature on ET was the main source  
for the discussion about allocation, as well as being important for the discussion on the functioning 
of the EU ETS. 
In order  to explain  why the EU ETS was set  up and how it  has developed into an inefficient 
mechanism to lower GHG emissions in the EU ETS member countries4, chapter 1 provides part of 
the historical and political context of ET as a concept, and attempts to explain how and why it 
emerged as a policy mechanism of choice for the EU. Chapter 2 focuses on the principal structural 
flaws of the EU ETS by discussing the origins and implications of its allocation regime. Chapter 3 
is concerned with the structure of the EU ETS, and provides key information about what the EU 
ETS is and how it works, including the scheme's connections to the wider international framework 
of the Kyoto Protocol.  Chapter 4 sheds light on the functioning of the EU ETS, and identifies 
important factors that contributed toward making the system ineffective. Chapter 5 summarises the 
anteceding  chapters  by  highlighting  central  facts  and  arguments,  and  thereby  presents  a  short 
answer to the research question this paper set out to answer. 
4 Henceforth this paper will for practical purposes refer to «EU ETS member countries» were EU ETS legal 
provisions that use the term «Member States» apply to EFTA countries as well. 
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Chapter 1: Towards emissions trading
This chapter attempts to answer why and how the EU ETS materialised. The origins of the EU ETS 
are traced back to the emerging consensus in the 1980s and early 1990s that a concerted effort by 
the international community was needed to prevent dangerous human interference with the climate 
system. This realisation led to the Earth Summit in 1992, and later to the signing of the Kyoto 
Protocol  in  1997.  This  chapter  also  describes  the  political  developments  which  concluded  in 
agreement that the EU should establish an ET scheme in order to comply with its commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol.  
1.1 From United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to Kyoto
During the 1980s governments across the world became increasingly aware of the growing risk of 
climate change and the undesirable consequences thereof. This prompted 166 nations to sign the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the 1992 Earth Summit 
in Rio de Janeiro. The 1992 Earth Summit also oversaw the signing of two sister Rio Conventions 
which  are  closely  linked  to  the  UNFCCC  and  the  concern  about  climate  change:  the  UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification. The UNFCCC 
articulated an agreement about the need to limit the growing amount of GHGs in the atmosphere so 
as to prevent dangerous human impact on global climate. In the words of the UNFCCC, its ultimate 
goal is
“...stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system...“ (Chapter 2).
The scientific  evidence concerning human impact  on the climate system was at  the time quite 
uncertain. Nevertheless, and in line with the principles of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete  the  Ozone  Layer  of  1987,  countries  agreed  that  due  to  the  potentially  disastrous 
consequences of climate change, it was incumbent upon them to commit considerable resources 
towards minimising the risk thereof. The Earth Summit resulted in an acknowledgement that the 
developed countries that constituted the membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) were responsible  for the vast  majority of  GHG emissions  since the 
industrial  revolution,  and that  these countries  therefore bear  the main responsibility to mitigate 
climate change that could occur as a consequence of the aforementioned emissions.
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The UNFCCC created the target that encouraged so-called Annex 1 countries to the convention to 
cut  their  carbon  dioxide  emissions  to  1990  level  by  the  year  2000.  The  Annex  1  countries 5 
comprised  the  members  of  the OECD  at  the  time,  and  a  number  of  economies  in  transition, 
including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and Central and Eastern European states. In 
addition to assuming a historic responsibility for the recent elevation of GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere, the Annex 1 countries moreover conceded that non-developed countries had a right to 
increase emissions as they developed and expanded their economies. 
The adaptation of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 was an important breakthrough for the UNFCCC. 
Whereas  the  UNFCCC  encouraged  its  parties  to  emission  cuts  and other  measures,  the  Kyoto 
Protocol legally commits its signatories to adhere to it. And the Kyoto Protocol was based on the 
principles of the UNFCCC, and included the provision that obliged OECD countries to cut carbon 
dioxide emissions to 1990 level, or base year or period levels6 (hereafter referred to as base year 
levels), by the year 2000. 
1.2 Early emissions trading
In the intervening years between Rio and Kyoto it had been dawning on decision makers that not 
enough was  being done to  address  the  threat  climate  change posed.  The question  was  how to 
achieve emissions cuts  in  the most  effective manner.  The Montreal  Protocol  had enjoyed great 
success with phasing out ozone-depleting substances. As early as in 2003, former United Nations 
(UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed that the Montreal Protocol was “perhaps the single 
most successful international agreement to date“7. 
The Montreal Protocol stipulated targets and timetables for emissions cuts for its signatories, and it 
also established an ET regime, albeit on a small scale. ET broke the surface in the economic science 
discourse in the 1960s, and it was put in practice in the United States of America (US) in the 1980s 
(Voss, 2007). Policy makers consequently looked to that success story as well as other relatively 
small ET regimes as models for tackling GHG emissions. Domestically the US had experienced 
success with ET in the area of pollution control and was the most enthusiastic supporter of ET, and 
5 A list of Annex 1 Parties to the Convention can be accessed at 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php
6 Most parties to the Kyoto Protocol use 1990 as their base year, but a few countries have been allowed to use an 
alternative base year, or average emissions for a period of several years (UNFCCC COP 2, 1996, p. 16).
7 un.org. International Day for the Preservation of the Ozone Layer. 16 September. Background.  Retrieved 17 April, 
2013, from http://www.un.org/en/events/ozoneday/background.shtml
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promoted it during the UNFCCC Treaty negotiations in 1992 (Newell, Pizer, & Raimi, 2012).  
Whereas the US sat down at the negotiations table at the Kyoto Conference an avid supporter of ET, 
in  the  EU  most  EU  institutions,  Member  States,  environmental  organisations  and  business 
federations were either opposed or highly sceptical of ET (Grubb et al., 1999, p. 94, as cited by 
Skjærseth & Wettestad,  2010).  When the US demanded ET be part  of the Kyoto Protocol,  the 
cleavage appeared to potentially torpedo an agreement. A compromise allowed a final text to be 
agreed upon, which stated that the parties could utilise ET should they so desire (Article 17). It was 
nonetheless  a  watershed  in  climate  policy  history  that  the  Kyoto  Protocol  became  the  first 
international vehicle for ET in GHGs by establishing the necessary mechanisms (Newell  et  al., 
2012). 
1.3 Towards emissions trading
In spite  of differing views across  the Atlantic,  the Europeans were perhaps not  as antagonistic 
towards ET as the Kyoto negotiations would indicate (Ellerman & Buchner, 2007). Some of the 
European resistance to ET have been ascribed to negotiations tactics (Skjærseth & Wettestad, 2010). 
Since the Earth Summit in 1992, carbon tax had been on the agenda in the EU but had disappeared 
again after failing to be deemed within the realm of the politically possible (Sterner, 2007, p. 3194). 
From the  perspective  of  the  Commission,  and leaving  aside  the  question  of  political  viability, 
taxation was not within EU competences. Therefore, confronted with a lack of alternative policy 
instruments and a perception that action needed to be taken against climate change, less than a year 
after the Kyoto Conference a European Commission (1998) communication observed that the EU 
could set up its own ET regime by 2005. 
Presumably, European politicians were gradually swayed by the same arguments that had made ET 
popular among US policy-makers. Stavins (1998) provided explanations why this happened in the 
US in relation to the establishment of the sulphur dioxide (SO2) allowance trading program in 1990, 
as well as outlined why command-and-control environmental regulation historically had been the 
norm. One factor which enhanced interest for more cost-effective environmental regulation in the 
US was the steadily increasing pollution control costs. Some improvement in the understanding of 
market-based mechanisms at the political level contributed to increased political support for ET. 
Because SO2 emissions were to be reduced significantly, not merely controlled, ET emerged as the 
by  far  most  cost-effective  alternative,  and  therefore  the  only  politically  viable  option.  One 
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additional point Stavins made, and which arguably is applicable to the introduction of the EU ETS, 
the opportunity costs for politicians associated with introducing a market-based instrument are least 
when the intention is to address a «new» problem, for which there is no policy instrument in place. 
In the wake of the Commission's  declaration of intent  emerged several policy papers,  until  the 
Green Paper on GHG Emissions Trading argued unrestrained for the establishment of an EU ETS 
(European Commission, 1999, 2000a).  The policy papers and the Green Paper argued for an EU 
cap-and-trade  system  with  auctioning  of  emission  allowances  and  national  emission  caps 
determined at EU level. 
It  should  be  noted  that,  after  the  Kyoto  Protocol  to  the  UNFCCC  was  signed  in  1997, the 
Directorate General (DG) Environment was subject to a change in staff—including the majority of 
the personnel of the climate change unit—which brought about a change in policy direction in 
favour of ET (Lefevere, 2005, p 96 as cited by Skjærseth & Wettestad, 2010). Henceforward the 
Commission, spurred on by DG Environment, played an important role in the realisation of the EU 
ETS  by  2005.  Apart  from  the  Green  Paper,  the  European  Commission  procured  guidance 
documents and research reports and created Working Group 3, which educated the actors about ET 
and  facilitated  discussion  between  them.  In  addition  to  the  official  record,  numerous  informal 
contacts were integral to the Commission's effort—in line with customary EU policy-making on 
any policy of relevance. An authoritative paper on the early stages of the ETS states
«In all, the Commission’s exercise of this role showed a technical competence and political astuteness that 
contributed significantly to the success of the EU ETS» (Ellerman & Buchner, 2007, p. 71).
At  the  time  the  Green  Paper  on  GHG  Emissions  Trading  appeared,  there  was  considerable 
divergence in opinion between national governments across the EU on the subject. This is evident 
from the governmental  submissions to the Green Paper  (European Commission,  2000b),  which 
moreover showed that  several  countries were negative or sceptical toward centralised decision-
making, Ireland perhaps most decidedly so. 
When the US withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, its entry into force became shrouded in 
doubt as people pondered on whether a minimum of 55 signatories responsible for at least 55%  of 
1990 carbon dioxide [CO2] emissions8 eventually would ratify the treaty. Confronted with a lack of 
8 The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol required the signing of a minimum of 55 signatories responsible for at 
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US leadership,  EU leaders  soon considered  it  requisite  that  Europe lead the  way in mitigating 
climate change on the global stage, demonstrating for other countries that the Kyoto targets could 
be met. In that context, the EU ETS emerged as the vehicle for doing such (Skjærseth & Wettestad, 
2010).
At this point, small-scale experiments with ET provided valuable experience. British Petroleum's 
(BP) internal ET regime9 was established in 1997, and was considered very successful (Victor & 
House, 2006). The Danish CO2 trading program started in 1999, and the perhaps most important, the 
UK Emissions Trading Scheme, ran from 2002. These programs helped familiarise all the relevant 
actors with ET. Positive experiences with ET were further bolstered by recommendations to set up 
ET  regimes  by  high-level  commissions  in  Norway  and  Sweden,  which  were  charged  with 
examining the feasibility of ET (Ellerman & Buchner, 2007). 
While the European elite was gradually convinced that ET was the way forward, DG Environment 
would not have its will about the design of the ET scheme. The informal consultations between the 
Commission and industry and national governments prior to the Commissions proposal for the ET 
Directive, served as a reality check for the Commission about the political economy of ET. The 
Member States' desire for allocation of emissions permits on a national level, free of charge, was 
imposed on the Commission, which subsequently included these central elements in its proposal for 
the ET Directive in October 2001 (Skjærseth & Wettestad, 2010). In 2003, the ET Directive became 
EU law (European Parliament and the Council, 2003), and it stipulated that the EU ETS would be 
up and running by 2005. 
The majority of Member States pushed through a mandatory ETS, but both Germany and the UK 
originally preferred a system based on voluntary participation. Germany considered that the existing 
German  regime  of  voluntary  agreements  with  industry  had  lower  abatement  costs.  However 
Germany ultimately went along with the majority, having seen its negotiation position undermined 
by internal divisions, and fearing that it might be outvoted by a qualified majority (Skjærseth & 
Wettestad, 2010).
least 55% of 1990 CO2 emissions. 
9 BP met its goal of reducing company emissions by 10 percent in 2002, seven years ahead of its original target. The 
program was widely considered successful and provided important lessons for future emissions trading programs. 
Nonetheless, BP's emissions trading program differed significantly from the EU ETS that later materialised. Victor 
and House (2006, p. 2112) described it as a management device, given that it did not have many of the hallmarks of 
a typical trading system.  
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1.4 The Kyoto Protocol and EU burden-sharing
At  the  7th Conference  of  the  Parties  to  the  UNFCCC in  2001 which  produced  the  Marrakesh 
Accords, details around the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol were agreed on. In anticipation of 
the  entry  into  force  of  the  Kyoto  Protocol—which  happened  in  2005—the  parties  established 
national emission reduction targets for the First Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol, from 
2008-2012.  These  targets  are  referred  to  as  assigned  amounts  (AAs),  or  quantified  emission 
limitation or reduction commitments (QELRCs). The EU-15 agreed to an 8% reduction of relevant 
GHGs compared to the base year levels. 
The Kyoto Protocol allows countries to fulfil their emissions reductions jointly, if they wish to do so 
(Article 3). When the EU, which in 2002 was the European Community (EC), adapted the Kyoto 
protocol, it signalled the intention of its Member States to fulfil the Kyoto commitments jointly 
(European Council, 2002). At the time the EU comprised 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom (the EU-15). Thus the EU-15 were responsible for ensuring a 
collective 8 percent reduction in GHG emissions below 1990 levels in the 2008-2012 period. The 
so-called EU-15 burden-sharing agreement10 redistributed the Kyoto QELRCs so as to reflect the 
wealth of the EU-15 countries at the time of the agreement. Hence rich EU-15 countries such as 
Germany, Denmark, and Luxembourg were committed to make big cuts in their GHG emissions 
compared  to  other  parties  to  the  Kyoto  Protocol.  And  these  QELRCs  would  be  the  basis  for 
distributing  emission  caps  in  the  EU  ETS.  Officially,  QELRCs  are  expressed  in  terms  of 
percentages of Kyoto base year levels, as displayed in figure 1. 
10 The burden-sharing agreement appears in Annex 2 of the European Council document (2002) which ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol on behalf of the EC. 
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Figure 1. Kyoto burden-sharing targets for EU-15 countries11
 
Source: European Environment Agency (EEA) 2002
1.5 Conclusions
The signing of the UNFCCC in 1992 declared that the signatories would endeavour to stabilise 
atmospheric GHG concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous human interference with 
the climate system. Developed countries acknowledged main responsibility to act. This served as a 
basis for the Kyoto Protocol, which legally committed signatories to adhere to its provisions. 
The US had pioneered emissions trading and had achieved good results with the mechanism, and 
succeeded  with  incorporating  it  into  the  Kyoto  framework.  Having  deemed  a  carbon  tax  not 
politically viable, and lacking an alternative policy instrument to cut GHG emissions, European 
politicians gradually moved from a negative to a positive stance toward ET. The US withdrawal 
from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 made clear that there was a global leadership vacuum in the fight 
against climate change. This helped convince European politicians that the EU had to demonstrate 
that the Kyoto targets could be met, and, incited by the Commission, ET became the vehicle for 
11 The figure displays the reduction commitments undertaken for each of the EU-15 Member States by 2008-2012 with 
1990 as the base year, in percentages and metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents. 
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doing so.
Thus the EU ETS was created by the ET Directive of 2003 and stipulated to be up and running by 
2005. Although the Commission advised otherwise, it had to give in to Member States' insistence 
that emission allowances should be allocated on the national level, free of charge. The Marrakesh 
Accords of 2001 codified EU-15 QELRCs for 2008-2012. The EU-15 burden-sharing agreement of 
2002 revised these by redistributing the sum of the commitments according to the wealth of the 
respective Member States, thus establishing the basis for calculating EU ETS national emissions 
caps.  
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Chapter 2: The allocation debate
This  chapter  explores  why the  EU ETS allocation  regime  which  was  created  involved  almost 
exclusively  free  allocation  of  allowances  and  national  determination  of  allocation  caps.  These 
questions  are  interesting  because,  as  this  paper  will  argue,  both  features  have  contributed 
significantly to the inefficiency of the EU ETS. This particularly applies to free allocation, of which 
there are several facets that can be related to the systemic inefficiencies which have been evident 
during the lifetime of the EU ETS. They will be highlighted in chapter 4. This chapter is concerned 
with  why  this  allocation  regime  came  into  place  in  spite  of  weighty  arguments  in  favour  of 
auctioning and centralised decision-making.
The  reasons  why  Member  States  and  private  sector  interests  imposed  their  will  to  have  free 
allocation in the EU ETS and national setting of allocation caps are found in the political economy 
of ET. The central dynamic consists on the one hand of business interests that predictably were 
engaged in rent-seeking. On the other hand, national authorities were susceptible to lobbying and 
concerns that auctioning might damage the competitiveness of national industries.
This chapter will also analyse why free allowances were given to the power sector as well, and 
suggest incompetence was probably an important reason. 
The 2009 reform ahead of Phase 3 introduced about 40% auctioning and established a common 
allowance cap. Without the occurrence of the financial crisis in 2008, the reform would have set out 
rules for more extensive auctioning, as policy-makers not only had realised that free allocation had 
given windfall profits, but that the threat to EU ETS competitiveness had been overstated. 
2.1 Pre-EU ETS literature on emissions trading12 
Since ET emerged in policy discussions, a question of considerable controversy has been how the 
initial allocation of allowances in an ETS should be done. The debate has centred on whether to 
allocate emission allowances for free, frequently called «grandfathering», or put the allowances up 
for auction. Convery's (2009) review of excellence in the EU ETS literature concluded that the ex 
ante literature on the subject tends to prefer auctioning to free allocation13. 
12 This section merely provides a glance at central pro-auctioning arguments from the ex ante literature at the time 
which initially convinced the Commission that auctioning was the best method of allocation. 
13 Also according to Cramton and Kerr (2002, p. 3), most researchers at the time favoured auctioning. 
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In the prelude to the passing of the ET Directive in 2003, the Commission thus reflected the view of 
the  majority of  the scientific  community by proposing that  auctioning was the  best  method of 
allocation (European Commission,  1999, 2000a).  The Green Paper on GHG Emissions Trading 
highlighted a few reasons for which the Commission considered auctioning to be a superior method 
of  allocation  to  free  allocation  (2000a,  pp.  18-19).  These  arguments were  available  in  the 
mainstream ex ante literature14. Firstly, the principle that polluter pays was presented as reasonable 
by the Commission. Secondly, auctioning would give all companies an equal and fair chance to 
acquire the allowances they wanted, and the Commission noted that governments thereby would 
avoid the need to take difficult and politically delicate decisions about how much to give each 
company  covered  by  the  trading  scheme.  Thirdly,  it  argued  that  auctioning  would  cause  less 
distortion of the market than free allocation would.  Fourthly,  auctioning would be fair  for new 
entrants. And fifthly, auctioning would create revenues that authorities could use toward promoting 
energy efficiency. 
The argument that auctioning would create revenues which could be put to good use resonates with 
a  concept  which  occupied  a  prominent  place  in  the  early  ex  ante  literature,  called  «revenue-
recycling».  Carbon  taxation  or  emission  allowance  auctioning  can  have  virtuous  effects  in 
combination with revenue-recycling, according to this literature. By using a suite of models of the 
US economy to examine the effects of recycling revenues from the imposition of a carbon tax in 
several different ways, Shackleton et al. (1993) concluded that the costs associated with a carbon 
tax  can  largely  be  offset  by  using  the  revenues  it  produces  toward  cutting  other  taxes  that 
discourage capital formation or labour supply. Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1997) cautioned that 
combined with pre-existing taxes, pollution taxes and quotas create a «tax-interaction effect» that 
elevates the cost of new pollution taxes and quotas. However, this negative effect can be offset by 
recycling the revenues from the latter by cutting marginal factor tax rates. Numerical simulations by 
Jensen and Rasmussen  (2000) further strengthened the argument in favour of recycling revenues 
from putting  a  price  on pollution.  They showed that,  albeit  at  the  cost  of  a  large  reduction  in 
employment in energy-intensive sectors and substantial stranded costs, revenue-recycling by way of 
cutting existing taxes incurs far lower welfare costs than free allocation of emission permits. 
By the choice of free allocation of the vast majority of allowances in the EU ETS, the arguments 
outlined  against  free  allocation  above  were  ignored,  including  the  threat  of  detrimental  tax-
interaction effects  without  the benefit  of revenue-recycling effects,  which apply to all  emission 
14 For instance, see Stavins (1998), and Cramton and Kerr (2002) 
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trading systems based on free allocation (Hepburn, Grubb, Neuhoff, Matthes, & Tse, 2006, pp. 139-
140). National political decision-makers thereby resolved—instead of letting all emitters pay for 
emissions in an equal manner—to take it upon themselves to explicitly select a group of companies 
to whom a shortage of allowances were to be given, thus discriminating them from other companies 
to whom sufficient allowances were to be given. The discussion below will attempt to explain the 
reasons why politicians discarded the alternative that scholars considered both most economically 
efficient and socially just. 
2.2 Political-economy determinants of allocation method
The US experiences with emission trading provide interesting insight when the different facets of 
the EU ETS are scrutinised. Stavins (1998) analysed why tradable emission permit schemes in the 
US virtually always had included initial free allocation of emission permits (74-76). He pointed out 
that the firms under such prospective regulation had wanted free allocation because of rent-seeking 
motives. Environmentalists had favoured ET over environmental taxes since whereas the former 
sets  specific  reduction  targets,  the  latter  promises  no  specific  reduction  yet  makes  the  cost  of 
environmental protection significantly more visible to the public. As regards politicians, Stavins 
argued  that  free  allocation  was  politically  more  attractive  than  auctioning  since  it  offered  less 
recalcitrant industry15 and greater control over the distributional effects of the ET.
Cramton and Kerr (2002) severely criticised free allocation as opposed to auctioning, but predicted 
that,  when the  US eventually  would  introduce  ET to  curb  GHG emissions,  contrary to  expert 
opinion,  «the  political  power  and persuasiveness  of  energy sector  interests»  would  ensure  that 
allowances would be given for free «to electric utilities and large industrial users» (p. 3). So Stavins 
(1998) and Cramton and Kerr  (2002) all argued that, in theory, the political economy of the US 
favoured free allocation of emissions permits, and the empirical evidence supported the theory. 
As the following discussion suggests, what the aforementioned papers say about the US political 
economy and ET seems in essence to have been the case with the formation of the EU ETS. It has 
already been briefly mentioned that ET was considered more politically feasible than a carbon tax 
by EU politicians. Two interacting aspects of the policy-making process behind the EU ETS that 
appear  to have been the nucleus of  the political  economy of  the design of  the EU ETS, were  
political concerns that the distributional effects of the system would include adverse effects on the 
15 Stavins clearly assumed that the regulated industries had wielded considerable influence on the design of the 
emissions trading schemes in question.
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competitiveness of affected community industry vis-à-vis extra-community industry, and the desire 
of prospective EU ETS industries to have free allocation as allocation method. 
The  Green  Paper  on  GHG  Emissions  Trading  mentioned  six  industrial  groups,  five  of  which 
expressed  a  strong  preference  for  free  allocation16.  The  muscular  lobbying  in  favour  of  free 
allocation by industry is generally acknowledged in the academic literature17. Brandt and Svendsen 
(2004) noted that the empirical evidence, in addition to theoretical predictions, showed that free 
allocation was the allocation method by which industry profited most from. The main reason for 
this is the wealth transfer that is free allocation of allowances which are saleable, but free allocation 
also supposes a subsidy to existing industry. Hence, rent-seeking made these industries agree that 
they wanted free allocation.
2.3 Lobbyism at the EU level
Brandt  and  Svendsen  argued  that  the  industries'  preference  for  free  allocation  is  a  plausible 
explanation for why decision-makers finally opted for free allocation. Markussen and Svendsen 
(2005) examined to what extent the interests of European interest organisations are reflected in the 
ET Directive by comparing the Green Paper on Emissions Trading with the final ET Directive, 
thereby comparing  the  policy proposal  before  lobbying,  and the  outcome after  lobbying.  They 
argued that powerful industrial interests played a part in influencing the allocation rules toward free 
allocation and determination of national allowance caps on the national level through lobbying. 
The degree of lobbying influence is obviously impossible to quantify, but the lobbying as such at 
least  evidences  that  the interests  in  question believed it  was  possible  that  they could influence 
proceedings. The same applies to the policy-making process of the US acid rain program, where 
power sector lobby groups lobbied—successfully—for free allocation (Hanoteau, 2003). 
Markussen and Svendsen (2005) highlighted the interests of the institutions which had ready access 
to the late part of the policy-making process of the ET Directive, and could influence it18: the (other) 
General  Directorates;  the  European  Parliament;  and  national  governments.  Markussen  and 
Svendsen  noted  that  the  Council—which  represents  the  Member  States—and  the  Commission, 
16 The sixth was the chemical sector which successfully escaped inclusion in the EU ETS due to the administrative 
challanges an inclusion would suppose. 
17 For instance, see Egenhofer (2007) and Convery, Ellerman, and De Perthuis (2008). 
18 Late in the policy-making process, lobby representatives are increasingly obliged to try to influence proceedings 
indirectly, either through national parliaments and governments, or members of the European Parliament (Varming 
et al., 2001, as cited by Markussen & Svendsen, 2005, p. 246).
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supported free allocation of allowances (247). But as mentioned, the Commission only supported 
free allocation after it effectively was compelled to do so by the national governments—certainly 
contrary to the will  of DG Environment.  As far  as the European Parliament  opposition to  free 
allocation is concerned, it was in the end immaterial because it failed to garner necessary support 
from the general public and stakeholders (Convery et al., 2008)
As regards the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), those that had been very critical of 
ET beforehand did not participate in a meaningful way in the discussions early on in the policy-
making process (Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, 2005). The NGOs that were given opportunity to 
voice their opinion at the stakeholder meeting in 2001 along with business interests did not have 
strong views about  which method should be used provided that  the method,  or  methods,  were 
transparent and did not undermine the stringency of allocation caps (European Commission, p. 3). 
In other words,  the NGOs in question did not mind the use of free allocation per  se,  and this 
arguably facilitated the realisation of the agenda of business interests to ensure that emitters would 
not have to pay for emission permits in auctions. 
2.4 Lobbyism at the national level
Returning to  the  discussion  of  the  influence  of  institutions  and  other  actors  on  the  process  of 
drawing  up  the  ET Directive,  the  question  of  how  the  preferences  of  these  institutions  were 
influenced by the national and European interest organisations in question at earlier stages, remains 
to be illuminated. In demand of particular interest is the Council, and the Member States. An ET 
system with auctioning of allowances could arguably not have materialised without the consent of 
national governments. And national governments appear to have been the key to the decision to opt 
for free allocation. Thus without analysing the influence of the mentioned interest organisations on 
national governments,  it  is not possible to assess with any accuracy the degree of influence of 
interest organisations on the EU-level policy-making process as regards  the decision to use free 
allocation.  
While undertaking an analysis of the degree of influence of interest organisations on the respective 
Member State governments is beyond the scope of this paper, a couple of studies from Germany 
provide some understanding of the influence of lobbying at the national level in the EU. By using 
the German Ecological Tax Reform to conduct a combined theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
role of interest groups in the making of environmental tax differentiation, Anger, Böhringer, and 
Lange (2006) showed that environmental tax differentiation is consistent with political economy 
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reasoning,  and  found  that  industries  with  more  powerful  lobbies  were  subjects  of  preferential 
treatment by the authorities. 
Anger, Böhringer, and Oberndorfer (2008) conducted an analysis of the influence of interest groups 
on the German EU ETS allowance allocation using a cross-section of German firms. They did not 
find evidence that lobbying alone affected the allocation process. However, they found that very 
large emitters were able to influence their allocation upwards through the combination of strong 
lobbying and the political argument that they were more severely affected by the regulation than 
other groups. Consequently they did achieve preferential treatment, and they also undermined the 
impact of EU ETS as a whole in the process by lowering the overall  abatement burden. These 
studies give credence to the argument that national governments were influenced by lobbying and 
were susceptible to concerns expressed by private sector stakeholders in relation to their decision to 
back free allocation as method of allocation instead of auctioning. 
2.5 Competitiveness and carbon leakage
One reason why national governments are highly susceptible to warnings from national industry 
that environmental regulation can have negative effects on their competitiveness is that a loss of 
competitiveness can lead to a decline in exports, a resulting lower gross domestic product, and a rise 
in  unemployment as  industrial  sectors that  have high exposure to  international  competition are 
forced to cut production as foreign competitors take over their market share. 
A second reason why government officials and environmentalists alike worry about competitiveness 
loss when planning environmental regulation is related to the concern about carbon leakage. IPCC 
(2007b) has defined carbon leakage as «the increase in CO2  emissions outside the countries taking 
domestic mitigation action divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries.» Frequently 
when  business  leaders  find  that  they  cannot  cope  with  international  competition  due  to  high 
production costs, they see an opportunity to relocate production capacity to countries where lower 
salaries,  lower  corporate  tax  rates,  and  less  demanding  regulation  create  an environment  that 
enables considerably lower production costs19. For the country from which production capacity is 
relocated,  this  implies  lost  tax revenues  and job losses.  But  it  also implies  reduced emissions, 
because factories have been closed down. However, this is generally not considered as abatement 
19 Currently, it is common to distinguish between two types of carbon leakage: «Investment leakage» refers to 
investment in emissions-intensive activities outside a zone in which it is relatively expensive to generate emissions, 
whereas «product leakage» refers to a decrease in EU producer's market share in both the internal and the external 
markets (Laing, Sato, Grubb, & Comberti, 2013, p. 16)
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neither by environmentalists nor by EU authorities, since emissions will increase where production 
has relocated to,  and, more importantly,  since a lack of environmental  regulation is  one of the 
factors  which  are  conducive  to  low production  costs,  global  net  emissions  often  increase  as  a 
consequence of relocation of production from the EU, to countries with lower production costs.  
Nonetheless, according to the definition, even if global net emissions decrease as a result of such 
relocation, it is still called «carbon leakage» (Wråke, 2009, p. 24). But it should be emphasised that 
environmental regulation that is predicted to induce a leakage rate that is quite small can still be 
viewed as poor policy by policy-makers, both because the implications of leakage for the regulated 
economy can be significant, and importantly, because such policies are deeply undesirable in the 
context of the political economy.  
The different sectors of an economy have different levels of exposure to international competition. 
As  regards  EU sectors  that  are  included  in  the  EU ETS,  their  different  levels  of  exposure  to 
international competition render some of them more vulnerable to costs incurred by participating in 
the EU ETS in terms of their profitability. Studying the competitiveness impacts from the EU ETS, 
Carbon Trust (2004) outlined three key determinants of competitiveness exposure which Hourcade, 
Demailly, Neuhoff, and Sato (2007) reiterated:
– CO2 intensity of production
– Ability to pass cost increases through to prices
– Opportunity to abate carbon 
CO2-intensive  production  is  particularly  vulnerable  to  elevated  electricity  prices  since  energy 
producers  are  able  to  pass  through  a  substantial  amount  of  the  EU Allowance  (EUA) cost  to 
consumers, thus increasing manufacturing costs across the board. Sectors which have the largest 
potentials for abating GHG emissions are naturally less exposed to higher costs that the EU ETS 
produces. As for the ability to pass cost increases through to prices, producers of internationally 
mobile products generally have less opportunity to do this, depending on the level of international 
competition they face. Pass-through of costs for these producers is partly prevented by increased 
electricity prices, and the potential loss of exports and reduced intra-community market share as a 
result of competition from imported products with a lower price (p. 16). 
The implication of the above factors is that CO2-intensive industry that moreover was exposed to 
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international  competition  had  the  strongest  incentives  to  be  outspoken  about  the  potential 
detrimental  competitiveness  effects  of  the  EU  ETS—which  it  was.  Some  energy-intensive 
producers  argued  specifically  for  free  allocation  early  in  the  policy-making  process  (European 
Commission, 2001). A sample of the concerns of such industries surfaced in interviews by Carbon 
Trust  (2004).  The  steel  sector,  by  virtue  of  being  highly  energy-intensive  and  exposed  to 
international competition, expressed its worries about its inability to pass through costs, the severe 
negative impact on prices a potential Chinese economic cool-down would have, as well as what was 
seen as limited abatement potential with contemporary technology. 
Prior to the ET Directive being proposed in October 2001 (and adapted in October 2003), few 
studies  of  the  competitiveness  implications  of  EU ET had  been  conducted.  One  of  these  was 
commissioned  by  the  OECD  in  2001  and  prepared  by  Mæstad  (2003),  who  used  a  partial 
equilibrium model to explore short to medium term competitiveness impacts on the steel sector by 
simulating a carbon tax on emissions of 25 US dollars per tonne CO2 (tCO2). In the scenario of this 
tax being levied on the EU-13, a substantial carbon leakage rate of 60% on average was predicted. 
A similar scenario was predicted by Gielen and Moriguchi (2002), who estimated the effects on the 
steel sector of a CO2 tax on Japan and the EU-15 of 10 US dollars per tCO2, and of 42 US dollars 
per tCO2, which predicted leakage rates of 35% and 70%, respectively. 
So these predictions suggested to EU politicians that the EU steel sector might suffer significant 
damage to its  competitiveness if  it  were to  pay for emissions under the new emissions trading 
regime. Whichever level of attention EU politicians generally devoted to the scientific literature on 
this subject at the time, the probability that these reports made politicians more inclined to favour 
free  allocation  are  increased  by the  circumstances  highlighted  thus  far  in  the  discussion  about 
lobbyism and competitiveness;  and they centre  around the  crucial  dynamic  at  the  heart  of  the 
policy-making process, namely the resourcefulness of industry to lobby to further their agenda, and 
the susceptibility of politicians to legitimate concerns about the competitiveness of major industrial 
sectors. 
2.6 The restricted time frame
Since the Commission planned to give itself and the Community scarce time to establish all the 
mechanisms necessary to make the ETS work by 2005, there was no time for filibuster or prolonged 
negotiations.  While  it  was  still  uncertain  if  and  when  the  ET  Directive  would  be  adopted, 
Christiansen and Wettestad (2003) noted that
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«The reason why the Commission proposed the use of grandfathering owes largely to the perception
that the chances of getting a system in place by 2005 could be undermined by opposition from key
Member States and lobby groups representing incumbents that would have to pay for allowances» (p. 11). 
Considering the arguments presented thus far, it seems highly unlikely that the Commission might 
have  been  able  to  persuade  its  opponents  into  changing  opinion  on the  question  of  allocation 
method in the short term. Some researchers (Egenhofer et al., 2011) have indeed qualified both free 
allocation and decentralised setting of caps as political inevitabilities.  However, within a longer 
time frame, and through a process of political deliberation—and a large portion of horse-trading—
in addition to scientific exploration of the subject, this might have happened. Consequently the time 
frame should be acknowledged as an underlying factor which affected the policy-making process by 
dictating that an agreement on the design of the system needed to be reached fairly quickly. 
2.7 Windfall profits in the energy generating sector and free allocation 
The following discussion is principally concerned with the windfall profits that occurred in the 
energy generating sector as a consequence of free allocation. However, initially it is necessary to 
clarify that there are in fact two types of windfall profits that occur in the power generating sector 
that are related to the EU ETS, of which only one is caused by free allocation. The other type of 
windfall profits is the one which is generally associated with ET and is called «the ET effect», and 
occurs regardless of allocation method. This impact on power generators' profit can however be 
positive or negative, since the effect is different for different types of power generators (e.g. high or 
low-CO2 emitting), and also vary according to several market-related factors, such as the marginal 
cost of production (see J.P.M Sijm, Hers, Lise, & Wetzelaer, 2008, pp. 125-126).
A feature of ET and deregulated electricity markets is that a significant share of the market value of 
allowances is passed through to consumers. Simulations of electricity markets, including the one 
carried out by Baron, Boemare, and Jakobsen (2002, as cited by Convery, 2009) of the Baltic Sea 
region,  anticipated  that  this  would happen.  Carbon Trust  (2004) also noted this  in  a  report  on 
competitiveness effects of the EU ETS.
Also  according  to  economic  theory,  windfall  profits  was  foretold  in  an  ETS  based  on  free 
allocation. The energy price consumers must pay is not affected by method of allocation. Rather, it 
is affected by the price of allowances and the amount of GHGs the production of one unit of energy 
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produces. And the price of allowances is determined by the supply and demand for allowances. 
Regardless of whether allowances are free or subject to auction, with a high supply of allowances 
the market will reach a saturation point, and when there are more sellers than buyers, the price falls
—and  conversely.  Therefore,  if  electricity  markets  are  deregulated,  the  difference  between 
auctioning and allocation of allowances free of charge is that with auctioning the authorities, or by 
extension the public,  pocket  the revenue from the auctioning of  allowances,  whereas  with free 
allocation, energy producers pocket the revenue from the increase in energy prices the emission 
trading scheme causes (Cramton & Kerr, 2002). 
Since economic theory sometimes fails to take all relevant factors into account and therefore do not  
predict  developments  with accuracy,  it  is  worth noting that  the  evaluation of  the  EU ETS has 
produced empirical evidence on power sector costs which supports the above mentioned theoretical 
prediction  that  auctioning  of  EUAs  does  not  have  an  impact  on  electricity  prices  (Cummins, 
O'Shea,  & Lyons,  2010).  If  policy-makers feared that  auctioning of EUAs to energy-producers 
might trigger increased electricity prices, it is plausible that they refrained from doing so to avoid 
detrimental effects on the competitiveness of energy-intensive industry. However, since both theory 
and electricity market simulations predicted otherwise, this seems unlikely.
As indicated in chapter 4, the total windfall profits in the power generating sector as a result of free 
allocation could possibly exceed 100 billion euros from 2005 to 2012. Whether policy-makers were 
properly informed about the possibility of windfall profits in deregulated electricity markets, and to 
what  extent  they  considered  the  implications  if  they  were  informed,  is  unclear.  Ellerman  and 
Joskow (2008) argued that,  in retrospect,  it  seemed evident that this issue had not been widely 
understood prior to implementation. Convery (2009) also observed that the effect did not feature 
much in  pre-implementation  policy-discussions.  The remarkable  incompetence this  attributes  to 
policy-makers does however beg the question of whether the windfall profits were anticipated yet 
ignored due to more pressing concerns.  But since the power generating sector did not face the 
international competition other sectors worried about, policy-makers could have decided to base 
allocation to power generators on auctioning, while opting for free allocation in other sectors. That 
would  have  invited  neither  legitimate  concerns  about  competitiveness,  nor  irresistible  lobbying 
pressure to change the policy. Therefore, the circumstantial evidence indicates that policy-makers at 
least to some extent were unaware that windfall profits would occur in the power generating sector 
as a consequence of free allocation. 
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2.8 Decentralised setting of caps and Phase 1 over-allocation
A pivotal  question  concerning  the  decision-making  structure  of  the  EU  ETS  was  whether  to 
determine allocation caps  centrally or  at  the national  level.  As mentioned above,  governmental 
submissions to the Green Paper on Emissions Trading articulated clear opposition to the notion of 
centralised  determination  of  allocation  caps  (European  Commission,  2000b).  The  electricity 
producers and the six industrial groups mentioned in the Green Paper outlined different views on 
the various aspects of ET, but with respect to determination of caps, nearly all of them expressed a 
preference for setting caps or targets at a national level (including negotiated agreements and on a 
voluntary basis)  (see Markussen & Svendsen, 2005). In a stakeholder meeting in 2001 industry 
voiced the same opinion with great clarity (European Commission, 2001). 
NGOs were the most critical group regarding the Member States' authority to decide on allocation 
caps. Despite the Annex 3 provision of the ET Directive which specified that allocations should not 
exceed  what  «is  likely to  be  needed»,  NGOs still  felt  this  gave  national  authorities  excessive 
discretion  (González,  2006).  However,  with  both  Member  States  governments  and  industry 
stakeholders  lined  up  against  this  position,  such  concerns  had  no  impact.  And  in  the  end  the 
Commission  was arguably presented  with a  fait  accompli  concerning national  determination of 
allocation caps20. 
Both  national  industries  and  national  authorities  were  worried  about  unfair  effects  on  the 
competitiveness of national industry—and as regards the intra-community effects, they worried that 
other Member States would be more favoured by the scheme than themselves—if allocation caps 
were decided on at the EU level (Kruger et al., 2007, p. 117). For national authorities, decentralised 
decision-making ensured that they were in control to contribute to prevent this from happening.   
The major industrial groups' resolve to empower national authorities with setting national allocation 
caps  indicate  that  they  saw it  as  clearly beneficial  to  them that  caps  would be set  by national 
authorities. However, the argument that industry was concerned with competitiveness effects to the 
extent  that  they  worried  about  equal  treatment  across  national  boundaries  in  the  EU  ETS,  is 
questionable. That is because national determination of caps could arguably not guarantee against 
unfair or unequal treatment any more than centralised setting of caps. This makes it plausible that 
the major industrial groups had other reasons for their broad agreement to advocate national setting 
20 Grubb, Azar, and Persson (2005, pp. 127-128) argue that national determination of allocation caps was an 
unavoidable prerogative of Member States. 
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of caps.
A more credible reason for this preference is rent-seeking—a desire to lower the costs associated 
with being included in the EU ETS. Given the general susceptibility of national governments to 
concerns about their major national industries' competitiveness, EU ETS industry had reasons to 
expect that allocations would be more generous when decided on by national authorities—even if 
they were subject to a final approval by the Commission. Possibly, they also realised that they could 
influence allocations upwards in the process of presenting the authorities with data in order for them 
to determine allocations. And generous allocation caps would imply a lower abatement burden on 
EU ETS industry, which would then face lower costs as a result of ET.
2.9 The 2009 revision changes allocation regime ahead of Phase 3
The 2009 revision of the EU ETS (European Parliament and the Council, 2009a) addressed the two 
major structural inefficiencies discussed so far in this chapter, decentralised setting of caps and free 
allocation. The detrimental effects on the overall stringency and hence efficiency of the EU ETS 
were obvious enough for the EU ETS member countries to agree to a progressively decreasing 
Community-wide  cap,  based  on  Phase  2  National  Allocation  Plans  (NAPs)  for  Phase  3  and 
onwards.
As for free allocation, this question was more difficult to address given continued strong opposition 
to auctioning from the stakeholders. However, the growing body of emerging literature on EU ETS 
and competitiveness  and carbon leakage gave  political  decision-makers  greater  insight  into  the 
probable consequences  of  increased use  of  auctioning.  This  made them less  dependent  on and 
susceptible to stakeholder warnings about carbon leakage effects. 
The  ex  ante  EU  ETS  literature  on  competitiveness  loss  and  carbon  leakage  has  considerable 
variation in terms of its findings, which is a result of the difference in assumptions which are made. 
For instance, in any model the assumed carbon price is crucial to the estimation of carbon leakage 
in  the EU ETS.  However,  as Venmans (2012) indicated in an EU ETS literature review which 
included a number of ex ante estimates of EU ETS-induced carbon leakage, the majority—many of 
which were published before 2009—concluded with fairly low competitiveness effects, including 
the ones that assumed high rates of auctioning. For example—but admittedly in the low end—
Manders and Veenendaal (2008) estimated an EU economy-wide carbon leakage rate of merely 
0.3% under full auctioning. 
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Ex post  studies of carbon leakage did not generate results which could justify a continuation of 
giving nearly all allowances away for free. Reinaud (2008) found no evidence of carbon leakage in 
the  steel,  cement  and primary aluminium sectors—sectors  which  were deemed vulnerable  in  a 
Commission  report  on  international  competitiveness  (2006b).  Similarly,  Demailly  and  Quirion 
(2008) found that the iron and steel industry had suffered only small competitiveness losses due to 
the EU ETS. 
Nevertheless, some sector-specific ex ante studies of vulnerable sectors gave worrying estimates of 
carbon leakage, such as Ponssard & Walker (2008). And as policy-makers contemplated scaling up 
auctioning of allowances dramatically in Phase 3, the financial crisis started to unravel in 2008 and 
completely changed the picture. Philippe de Buck, the then director general of Business Europe, 
acknowledged  a  comprehensive  lobbying  effort  by  all  his  constituents,  who  mobilised  large 
numbers  of representatives who were able  to push on all  levers of government simultaneously. 
Under strong lobbying pressure from industry, politicians reconsidered the allocation policy as the 
financial  crisis worsened in late 2008. Among the key decision-makers who changed sides and 
became supporters of continued free allocation to industry was German chancellor Angela Merkel. 
Subsequently  the  revised  allocation  regime  was  softened  (Chaffin,  2009),  and  auctioning  was 
restricted to about 40% of allowances.
2.10 Conclusions
Free allocation was severely criticised in the ex ante literature, and the use of free allocation in the 
EU ETS in Phases 1 and 2 invited a barrage of criticism from academia. For a number of reasons 
free  allocation  appeared  inferior  to  auctioning  of  EUAs.  Grandfathering  would  exclude  the 
possibility to recycle revenues from auctioning to mitigate negative distributional effects of the EU 
ETS and enhance energy efficiency; it would not implement the «polluter pays» principle; it would 
cause more distortion of the market; and complicate fair treatment of new entrants. 
The political economy nevertheless favoured free allocation and national determination of caps. 
The dynamic which favoured free allocation consisted of rent-seeking industrial stakeholders on the 
one hand, and on the other hand politicians who were concerned about and susceptible to worries 
expressed by the former about negative competitiveness impacts of the EU ETS. 
Past experiences with emissions trading; the process which concluded in the ET Directive; studies 
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which have been conducted on the effects of lobbyism on environmental policy in Germany; and 
the susceptibility of politicians to legitimate competitiveness concerns all point in the direction that 
stakeholder industry had a crucial influence on the decision to use free allocation. Energy-intensive 
industry with high exposure to international competition, such as the steel sector, played a key role 
in convincing policy-makers to use free allocation, as such sectors were considered particularly 
exposed to carbon leakage. Two studies which simulated the imposition of a carbon tax predicted in 
excess of 50% carbon leakage in the EU. NGOs which were involved in stakeholder consultations 
did not object to the use of free allocation per se, and thus facilitated the outcome. 
As regards the decision to chose decentralised determination of allocation caps, a political-economy 
dynamic  was at  work which  was very similar  to  the  dynamic  behind the  decision  to  use  free  
allocation: Stakeholder industry was plausibly engaged in rent-seeking as setting of caps at  the 
national  level  appeared conducive to  less stringent  allocation caps,  because national  authorities 
worried about unfair effects on the competitiveness of national industries, in addition to worrying 
more generally that centralised setting of caps might produce some kind of economic disadvantage 
vis-à-vis other Member States.
With the probable exception of windfall profits from free allocation—which however was predicted 
by the scientific literature—the use of free allocation and national setting of caps was not a faux pas 
in the sense that the policy-makers involved were oblivious to the negative implications of the 
design.  The Commission articulated arguments  from the literature that  favoured auctioning and 
centralised decision-making, but the ET Directive instead reflected a political compromise—some 
say a political inevitability—which was necessary in order to get the system up and running on 
short notice. 
The negative effects of national setting of caps on the overall stringency of the EU ETS were so 
obvious that a change to a EU ETS-wide cap was inevitable, which the 2009 revision introduced. 
Emerging studies on EU ETS competitiveness impacts indicated that large increases in auctioning 
could  be  made  without  significant  carbon  leakage.  A large-scale  lobbying  effort  on  behalf  of 
stakeholders  combined  with  the  sudden  impact  of  the  financial  crisis  in  2008  mellowed  the 
determination  of  the  political  establishment  to  monumentally  increase  auctioning,  resulting  in 
agreement to auction about 40% of EUAs in Phase 3.
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Chapter 3: The structure of the EU ETS
This  chapter  principally  provides  information  about  the  legal  provisions  for  the  EU  ETS; 
information that is necessary to understand how the system works and how it has developed into an 
inefficient instrument to curb GHG emissions. The main topics are the scope of the EU ETS as 
regards GHGs and sectors of the economy covered; provisions for the allocation process; links to 
the international framework under the Kyoto Protocol; and the structural changes which took effect 
upon entry into Phase 3 (2013-2020) of the EU ETS. 
3.1 Original EU ETS structure: Phases 1 and 2 (2005-2012)
When the EU ETS started operating, it was focused on high-emitting installations in the heat and 
power generating industry and on energy-intensive industrial sectors21. It covered the energy sector; 
production and processing of metal ore and production of pig iron and steel22;  mineral industry 
including cement-  and glass  production;  and pulp and paper  production.  Beyond the  dominant 
political considerations, administrative considerations also affected which industries were finally 
included. The chemical sector was not included due to the administrative hurdles presented by the 
prospect of regulating the numerous and small producers, many of whom emitted all the GHGs that 
would be regulated by the EU ETS (Brandt & Svendsen, 2004, p. 78). In 2008 around 11 000 
installations were covered, and they accounted for about 50% of EU's total CO2 emissions and about 
40% of its GHG emissions (European Commission, 2008). 
In Phase I the EU ETS comprised the 25 EU Member States. In Phase 2 the EU and hence the EU 
ETS, grew to 27 Member States, and in addition EFTA countries Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein 
joined the scheme. Whereas the Commission oversees the implementation of EU ETS regulation in 
Member States, the EFTA Surveillance Authority has this responsibility for EFTA countries, albeit 
in close cooperation with the Commission (Julia Reinaud & Philibert, 2007).
21 In Annex 1 to the original ET Directive there are provisions for which installations are covered by the scheme. Only 
combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 megawatt are included, and for other sectors there 
are minima production capacities for installations covered by the scheme.
22 Primary and secondary fusion
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The GHGs mentioned in the ET Directive are the same as those included in the Kyoto Protocol23: 
Carbon dioxide [CO2]
Methane [CH4]
Nitrous Oxide [N2O]
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs)
Sulphur Hexafluoride [SF6]
Whereas the ET Directive included the mentioned GHGs as they are covered by the Kyoto Protocol, 
EU ETS actually only regulated CO2 emissions in Phase 1. It is by far the most important GHG, and 
in 2010 it accounted for over 82% of GHG emissions in EU-27 (European Environment Agency, 
2012a). In Phase 2 EU ETS was marginally expanded by the inclusion of N2O emissions from the 
production of nitric acid by a number of Member States (European Commission, 2013d). The other 
GHGs mentioned in the ET Directive are however relevant to the generation of the international 
Kyoto emission permits that are discussed below. 
For purposes of measurement, GHGs included in the EU ETS which are not carbon dioxide are 
translated into carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e); usually tonnes of CO2e (tCO2e). One tonne of 
carbon dioxide equivalent is equal to one metric tonne of carbon dioxide. GHGs are translated into 
CO2e   by multiplying  the  amount  of  the  GHG in  question  with  its  Global  Warming  Potential 
(GWP). 
GWP describes a GHGs capacity to trap heat in the earth's atmosphere over a given time interval. 
100 years is the time interval which is used  in the process of calculating GWPs in the EU ETS and 
in international ET24. The GWPs currently in use were published as part of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Second Assessment Report: Climate Change 1995 (SAR) (IPCC 
Second Assessment Report, 1996)25 26.
23 Certain GHGs, such as hydrochlorofluorocarbons and chlorofluorocarbons, also deplete the ozone layer and are 
being phased out under the Montreal Protocol, wherefore they are not included in the Kyoto Protocol .
24 Because the various GHGs have vastly different life spans in the atmosphere, during which they absorb different 
levels of radiation, their GWP will vary greatly assessed over different time intervals. GHG life spans in the 
atmosphere ranges from 1.5 years for HFC-152a , to 50 000 years for perfluoromethane. For instance, relatively 
short-lived methane has a GWP of 56 over 20 years, but only 6.5 over 500 years. And long-lived sulphur 
hexafluoride has a GWP of 16 300 over 20 years, but 34 900 over 500 years.
25 See unfccc.int
26 While environmental policy instruments such as the EU ETS and Kyoto mechanisms continue to be based on the 
GWPs in the SAR from 1996, GWPs of GHGs have since been reevaluated. In the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: 
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Table 1: GHG GWP27 with a time horizon of 100 years for EU ETS GHGs28.
GHG GWP
CO2     1
CH4   21
N2O  310
SF6 23 900
Source:  IPCC Second Assessment  Report  1995,  The  Science  of  Climate  Change:  Summary for  Policymakers  and  
Technical Summary of the Working Group 1 Report, page 22
In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has a total cap on emissions which is the sum of the 
national caps of all its Member States. The EU ETS covers only some sectors of the EU economy 
and therefore has a smaller emissions cap. As part of the particular decentralised decision-making 
structure of the EU ETS29, national EU ETS caps were determined at the national level. Before each 
phase,  the  EU  ETS member  countries  were  obliged  to  submit  to  the  Commission  NAPs  that 
proposed in detail how they wished to carry out the allocation of emission permits30, which are 
called EUAs. One EUA means an allowance to emit one metric tonne of CO2e. The amounts of 
allowances  the  individual  national  governments  resolved  to  allocate  to  EU  ETS  installations 
determined the distribution of the respective national emissions reduction commitments undertaken 
in the EU burden-sharing agreement between the EU ETS sectors and the non-EU ETS sectors; and 
hence the overall reduction commitment the EU ETS has. 
Excepting the first phase, the NAPs were to be submitted at least 18 months prior to the initiation of  
the next phase. The Commission could reject the plan if any aspect of it contravened with Article 10 
or the criteria for NAPs listed in Annex 3 to the ET Directive. During Phase 1 the Commission 
moreover produced several detailed guidelines and communications about how the provisions for 
NAPs should be interpreted by EU ETS member countries (European Commission, 2004a, 2004b, 
Climate Change 2007 (AR4) (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, 2007a), GWPs were generally adjusted upwards. 
Notably, methane, one of the major GHGs, is by AR4 considered to have a GWP of 25, not 21, as according to the 
SAR.
27 Global Warming Potential referenced to the updated decay response for the Bern carbon cycle model and future
CO2 atmospheric concentrations held constant at current levels.
28 Hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocarbons are two groups of gases also covered by the EU ETS, but since each have 
numerous variants with different properties and hence different GWPs, they are not included here. 
29 See Kruger, Oates, and Pizer (2007)
30 EFTA NAPs were submitted to the Commission via the EFTA Surveillance Authority.
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2004c, 2005, 2006a). 
The ET Directive dictated that, for Phase 1, a minimum of 95% of allowances were to be allocated 
for free, leaving the Member States the option of auctioning a maximum of 5% of the allowances. 
For Phase 2, at least 90% of the allowances were to be allocated free of charge. 
Every operator of an installation which is regulated by the EU ETS is obliged to surrender EUAs by 
30 April each year that cover the installation's total emissions of relevant GHGs in the preceding 
calendar  year,  and  the  authorities  shall  subsequently  cancel  them.  If  such  emissions  from an 
installation exceeds the number of allowances its  operator  has surrendered for the installation's 
emissions, EU ETS member countries shall fine the operator EUR 10031 for each excess tCO2e. On 
the other hand, whereas operators are free to keep EUAs from one year to the next within a phase,  
EUAs which have not been surrendered and hence not used during a phase, shall be cancelled by 
the competent authorities at the start of the subsequent phase32. 
EU ETS member countries are responsible for ensuring that adequate monitoring and reporting of 
emissions  takes  place.  Individual  operators  are  charged with  reporting their  emissions,  and the 
national authorities shall seek to verify the reports. EU ETS member countries were also obliged to 
establish  a  register  for  proper  accounting  of  the  different  aspects  of  the  allowance  allocation 
process. 
3.2 The Kyoto framework and the Linking Directive
The Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have emission budgets that they must comply with in order to 
comply with the Kyoto Protocol during the First  Commitment Period,  from 2008 to 2012. The 
budgets are based on the assigned amount each Party is allowed to emit, and which is determined 
according  to  the  Party's  base  year  emissions  and  its  Kyoto  target.  The  assigned  amounts  are 
measured in assigned amount units (AAUs), and one AAU is equal to one tCO2e. 
There are so-called «flexible mechanisms» in place which allows the Parties to sell off surplus 
AAUs, or to increase their assigned amounts in various ways.  The Linking Directive which was 
adopted in 2004 (European Parliament and the Council) opened the door for use in the Community 
31 However, in Phase 1 the excess emissions penalty was set at 40 EUR per tCO2e. And from 2013, the amount 
increases in accordance with consumer prices (European Parliament and the Council, 2008).
32 In Phase 1 there was initially an opening for discretionary banking of allowances by the Member States. However, 
in 2006 the Commission made a prohibiting move by indicating that it would be interpreted as state aid (2006a).
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scheme of emission permits from two project-based flexible mechanisms created under the Kyoto 
Protocol. One is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which allows Annex 1 parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol to invest in projects  that reduce GHG emissions in non-Annex 1 countries and 
obtain carbon credits in return. CDM carbon credits are called Certified Emission Reduction units 
(CERs) and can be traded internationally between emission trading systems and other parties. The 
second mechanism is Joint Implementation (JI) by which Annex 1 countries can cooperate to cut 
GHG emissions, allowing an Annex 1 country to invest in projects that reduce GHG emissions in 
another  Annex 1  country and obtain  carbon  credits  in  return.  The  JI  carbon credits  are  called 
Emission Reduction Units (ERUs). Like the EUA, one CER or ERU is equal to one tCO2e.
EU ETS member countries were able to allow operators to surrender CERs purchased through the 
CDM in  addition  to  EUAs  from 2005,  and  ERUs  purchased  through  the  JI  mechanism were 
likewise permitted from 2008. However, some activities generate CERs and ERUs which are not 
accepted in the EU ETS. Such credits obtained from nuclear projects are among those that are not 
accepted33,  and  projects  based  on  land-use,  land  use  change  and  forestry  (LULUCF)  are  also 
excluded  from  use  in  the  EU  ETS.  The  two  mechanisms  allows  GHG  emission  cuts  to  be 
accomplished more efficiently; the logic behind it is the same as the one underpinning ET within 
the EU ETS. 
Yet,  according to the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol  and the Marrakesh Accords,  the use of 
carbon credits from the project-based mechanisms should be supplemental to a country's effort to 
fulfil its Kyoto obligations. The nature of the «supplementarity» of the flexible mechanisms was 
however  not  specified  in  those  agreements.  The  Linking  Directive  conferred  on  the  EU  ETS 
member countries to specify in their NAPs from 2008 the limit for how many CERs and ERUs 
operators  of  each  installation  can  surrender  in  terms  of  a  percentage  of  the  allocation  to  each 
installation, in a manner consistent with the supplementary principle.
3.3 Aviation introduced from 2012 
In 2008 a new directive (European Parliament and the Council) was adopted which added aviation 
to the sectors included in the EU ETS34.  Starting 1 January 2012, the aviation sector would be 
allocated  EUAs  equivalent  to  97%  of  historical  emissions  during  the  first  year;  and  EUAs 
equivalent to 95% of historical emissions during Phase 3, subject to revisions. In both periods, 15% 
33 Also, acceptance of credits from hydroelectric projects exceeding 20 MW of installed capacity is subject to certain 
conditions (see European Commission, 2013f)
34 However, the aviation sector has a separate emissions cap.
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of allowances had to be auctioned. And only CO2 emissions are accounted for.
2012 was also the year in which national EU ETS registries were replaced by a central  Union 
registry, and included accounts for aviators. At the same time the European Union Transaction Log 
(EUTL) started operating and took over the duties of the Community Independent Transaction Log 
(CITL), which till then had been charged with checking, recording, and authorising all transactions 
taking place between accounts in national registries (European Commission, 2013d). 
All  flights  arriving  or  departing  from an aerodrome  within  the  EU ETS were  covered  by the 
scheme,  thereby including extra-community flights  to  and from EU ETS member  countries.  A 
provision  was  established  whereby  incoming  flights  could  be  exempt  from the  scheme  if  the 
country of origin were taking measures to limit aviation emissions from departing flights. On 24 
April  2013  a  proposal  by  the  Commission  (European  Parliament  and  the  Council)  to  exempt 
international flights from enforcement of the ETS Directive with respect to emissions reporting and 
surrendering of allowances for the year 2012, was accepted in anticipation of the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) General Assembly in autumn 2013. 
3.4 Revision in 2009 ahead of Phase 3 (2013-2020)
In Phase 3 the EU ETS expanded and covered a slightly larger part of the economy. In quantitative  
terms it also expanded, as Croatia became the 31th EU ETS country in 2013. By the inclusion of 
aluminium production, all production of metals was covered by the scheme. Also, PFCs emissions 
from aluminium production were included. A greater share of N2O emissions were covered as well, 
as N2O emissions from the production of adipic,  glyoxal and glyoxlic  acids were added to the 
regime.
The 2009 revision of the EU ETS (European Parliament and the Council, 2009a) made significant 
changes to the structure of the EU ETS. Importantly, it eliminated the use of NAPs and removed the 
authority of national governments to determine national allowance caps, and hence the overall cap 
of the EU ETS. Instead it introduces so-called community wide quantities of allowances that are 
issued yearly, starting in 2013. This cap is determined to decrease by a linear factor of 1.74% yearly 
compared to the average annual allowances issued by EU ETS member countries in Phase 2. By 
2020 the EU ETS will thus deliver 21% cuts in emissions compared to 2005 level. 
In Phase 3 the EU ETS is part of a wider framework known as the EU climate and energy package,  
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which is designed to achieve a 20% reduction of GHG emissions compared to base year levels by 
2020.  The  Effort  Sharing  Decision  (European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  2009b) established 
emissions targets for non-EU ETS sectors for EU Member States and is projected to deliver around 
10% reduction compared to 2005 level. By adding that reduction to EU ETS reductions, the overall 
goal of the climate and energy package will be achieved (European Commission, 2013c). 
The 2009 revision also established auctioning as the default method of allocation for Phase 3 and 
onwards. In 2013 over 40% of allowances will be auctioned, and this number will rise progressively 
on an annual basis  during Phase 3.  Electricity producers will  as a general rule  receive no free 
allowances in Phase 335. Manufacturing industry will receive 80% of allowances for free in 2013, a 
number  which  will  decrease  in  linear  fashion  to  30% in  2020.  The  goal  is  that  by  2027,  all 
allowances will be auctioned (European Commission, 2013a). 
Currently two auction platforms have been established. The European Energy Exchange (EEX), 
located  in  Leipzig,  functions  as  the  common  auctioning  platform  for  most  EU  ETS  member 
countries. The  second is ICE Futures Europe (ICE), located in London. 
Another  major  change  in  Phase  3  was  the  introduction  of  harmonised  EU-wide  rules  for  free 
allocation  and  the  use  of  benchmarks,  set  out  in  the  Benchmarking  Decision  (European 
Commission,  2011b).  Generally product benchmarks are  based on the average of the 10% best 
performing installations in terms of GHG emissions across the EU ETS. If installations qualified for 
free allowances meet the benchmarks, they get the allowances they need for free. If they fail to meet 
them, they will get fewer allowances than they need for free (European Commission, 2013e).
In accordance with the rules in the Benchmarking Decision, Member States have submitted to the 
Commission preliminary calculations of the amounts of allowances they will allocate for free in 
2013, which is currently under consideration by the Commission. The EFTA Surveillance Authority 
considers whether these so-called national implementation measures (NIMs) are compliant with the 
relevant legal provisions for the EFTA countries. If NIMs allocations exceed the total allowance 
cap, the Commission will apply a cross-sectoral correction, after which EU ETS member countries 
can make final decisions on allocations (ibid.). 
35 There are however provisions for free allocation to installations in Member States with poor infrastructure so as to 
facilitate modernisation (European Parliament and the Council, 2009a, p. 76).
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In anticipation of a new global climate change agreement (replacing the Kyoto Protocol), the EU 
ETS Directive36 also included provisions for transfer of CERs and ERUs unused in Phase 2 to be 
transferred to Phase 3. However, the use of such credits from projects involving the destruction of 
trifluoromethane [CHF3] and N2O from adipic acid production has essentially been banned in Phase 
337 (European Commission, 2011c). 
While the continuation of free allocation to certain sectors in Phase 3 was aimed at  preventing 
carbon leakage,  the EU state  aid rules were also revised ahead of Phase 3 in such a way that 
Member States could use subsidies 
«to prevent a significant risk of carbon leakage due to EUA costs passed on in electricity prices supported by 
the beneficiary, if its competitors from third countries do not face similar CO 2 costs in their electricity prices 
and the beneficiary is unable to pass on those costs to product prices without losing significant market share» 
(European Commission, 2012a, p. 9). 
The option of subsidies in these scenarios did not apply to all sectors, but to a relatively broad range 
of  sectors  and sub-sectors38,  a  few of which are manufacturing of  organic based and inorganic 
chemicals; basic iron and steel production; and production of aluminium, copper, lead, zink and tin. 
New subsidies given in accordance with these guidelines were designed to be degressive to avoid 
aid dependency. However, the aid intensity, measured as a percentage of the eligible costs incurred 
because of increased electricity prices due to EUA cost pass-through, were scheduled to decrease 
only marginally in the course of Phase 3, from 85% in 2013 through 2015, to 75% in 2019 and 
2020. 
3.5 Conclusions
The EU ETS grew from including 25 (EU) Member States in Phase I, to 31 member countries in 
2013. In 2008 the EU ETS accounted for about 40% of EU's total GHG emissions. In 2013, this 
share had risen to about 45%. In line with the international Kyoto framework to which the EU ETS 
has been linked, the EU ETS covers six different GHGs. However, as regards emissions from EU 
ETS installations, the scheme only regulated CO2 emissions in Phase 1; added  N2O emissions in 
36 Whereas the original directive which provided provisions for the establishment of the EU ETS was referred to as the 
«ET Directive», the directive resulting from the 2009 revision is referred to as the «EU ETS Directive» and 
comprises provisions from the ET Directive in addition to amendments.
37 Moreover, the use of international credits in the EU ETS is currently under review, and as of 12 July 2013 the EP 
and the Council are scrutinising a draft Commission regulation on international credit entitlements (European 
Commission, 2013b).
38 The relevant sectors and sub-sectors are listed in Annex 2 to the Commission communication (2012a).
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Phase 2; and PFCs in Phase 3. Some new sectors were included in the scheme in Phases 2 and 3, 
and by Phase 3 all production of metals were covered. 
Aviation was included in the EU ETS from 2012, but the application of the EU ETS to international 
flights that either arrive in or depart from a country outside the scheme has currently been deferred 
for the year 2012, as EU politicians hope significant steps towards an international agreement on 
aviation emissions can be made in 2013.  
The entry into Phase 3 saw the elimination of NAPs and removed the responsibility of national 
governments to set national allowance caps, and hence the overall cap of the EU ETS. An EU ETS-
wide cap came into place, and is set to decrease by 1,74% annually to 2020. This will ensure a 
reduction of EU ETS GHG emissions of 21% compared to 2005 level; contributing to achieving the 
aim of a 20% reduction in total emissions by 2020.
Whereas auctioning of allowances was restricted to maximum 5% in Phase 1 and 10% in Phase 2, 
Phase 3 introduced a regime which is set to incrementally augment the use of auctioning, from 
around 40% of allowances in 2013. In Phase 3 free allocation is partly dependent on achieving 
common  benchmarks  for  efficient  production.  The  goal  is  to  auction  all  allowances  by  2027. 
However,  increased  use  of  auctioning  raised  concerns  about  carbon  leakage,  which  led  to  a 
relaxation of state aid rules allowing for subsidising exposed sectors to cover most of the increase in 
electricity prices ET causes.  
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Chapter 4: The functioning of the EU ETS 
This chapter will highlight important aspects of how the EU ETS has worked since its inception.  
The  proverbial  road  has  been  riddled  with  potholes.  First  initial  problems  which  mainly were 
features of Phase 1 will be examined. This includes over-allocation, which was facilitated by the 
decentralised setting of allocation caps. Then the large windfall profits from free allocation in the 
power sector in Phases 1 and 2 are looked at, before the perverse incentives for new entrants and 
closures caused by free allocation is discussed. The chapter then moves on via the development of 
the chronically low EUA spot price, to the complexities of assessing abatement caused by the EU 
ETS,  and  the  view  of  the  scholarly  literature.  Whereas  the  EU  ETS  has  incentivised  modest 
abatement in Phase 1, and probably in Phase 2 as well, the discussion turns to why the scheme 
seems to have failed to induce a shift to low-carbon strategies and low-carbon innovation. Then the 
inefficiencies of the use of credits from the flexible mechanisms is discussed. Finally the inclusion 
and subsequent one-year derogation of the EU ETS regulation of most of aviation emissions are 
explained, before the situation in Phase 3 and the future prospects of the EU ETS are evaluated.
4.1  Phase 1: A trial period
The ET Directive of October 2003 stipulated that the EU ETS would be working from 2005. This 
gave the EU and national  authorities  scarce time to establish the institutions  and infrastructure 
necessary for regulating and supervising a formidable chunk of the EU economy responsible for 
GHG  emissions.  But  it  was  precisely  an  acknowledgement  of  the  challenge  of  successfully 
implementing the EU ETS that prompted the EU to embark on the first phase already from 2005. 
The EU considered the first phase a trial period which would provide time to develop the system 
and accumulate experience.  This would ensure that the EU ETS would work adequately in the 
second phase, from 2008 to 2012, and thereby help the EU to fulfil its commitments in the First 
Commitment  Period  under  the  Kyoto  Protocol,  which  coincided with  Phase 2  of  the  EU ETS 
(Ellerman & Joskow, 2008)
Data problems were probably the most significant initial problem. Even if authorities had assembled 
fairly  good  data  on  CO2 emissions  which  had  been  used  to  report  to  the  UNFCCC,  the  data 
comprised aggregate numbers for energy use and did not extend down to the installation level39. 
39 Denmark was the single exception, as it had been operating a national CO2 eCO2emissions trading system 
(Ellerman & Buchner, 2007, p. 69).
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This was a significant problem given that the a priori preference was to make allocations according 
to installation-level emissions. The lack of such data required voluntary cooperation from EU ETS 
sectors with national authorities to draw up NAPs (Ellerman & Buchner, 2007, pp. 69-70). 
 
Combustion sources with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 megawatt (MW) were covered by the 
scheme.  As  Ellerman  and  Buchner  noted,  while  this  ensured  a  low  degree  of  distortion  of 
competition,  it  vastly  increased  the  number  of  installations  which  authorities  were  required  to 
allocate allowances to on an individual basis. 80% or more installations emitted 10% or less of CO2 
accounted for. If the threshold for inclusion in the scheme initially had been higher,  authorities 
would have been able to use the little time they had at their disposal to improve allocations to the  
relatively few installations which were responsible for the vast majority of emissions. This was 
however a problem which was resolved by Phase 2. 
4.2 Phase 1 over-allocation
As Wråke (2009) observed40, decentralised setting of allocation caps created a prisoner’s dilemma 
whereby national authorities saw that they could increase the competitiveness of national industries 
by inflating the national allocation cap. And because national authorities probably considered the 
possibility that other national decision-makers had made the same realisation, they were faced with 
the threat that the intra-EU ETS competitiveness of their national industries, in addition to their 
extra-EU ETS competitiveness, could be negatively affected by setting a stringent allocation cap. 
Wråke also highlighted that during the submissions of NAPs for Phase 1, the United Kingdom (UK) 
government requested to be able to increase its allocation cap after discovering that other countries 
had submitted NAPs with relatively less stringent caps41—an indication that national governments 
probably were preoccupied with  competitiveness  considerations  that  entered  into this  particular 
prisoner’s dilemma.  
Whereas base year levels emissions would have been preferred in order to have data consistent with 
the Kyoto framework for emissions reductions, the lack of such data made most national authorities 
use business as usual (BAU) projections to guide allocations, and they were generally related to 
historical  emissions.  But  these projections  had to  be made in  concert  with industry.  And since 
industry were in possession of the hard data, such cooperation was characterised by information 
asymmetry. Moreover, the tight time frame of setting up the EU ETS meant that no legal provisions 
40 Kettner et al (2008)) also noted that the decentralised structure created inherent incentives for generous allocations. 
41 The various NAPs were not submitted simultaneously (Wråke, 2009, p. 6)
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for the collection of such data had been established in time and it therefore happened on a voluntary 
basis (Ellerman & Buchner, 2007, p. 70). This exacerbated the asymmetric relationship that already 
existed because of national governments' risk-averse approach to competitiveness concerns. The 
consequence was that those sections of industry that produced the most optimistic or exaggerated 
projections would profit most from subsequent allocations42 (Michael Grubb et al., 2005). And this 
lead to over-allocation in Phase 1. This is supported by Anger et al (2008), who found evidence of 
successful lobbying for increased allocations in Germany.
Ellerman  and  Buchner  (2008) estimated  that  6% of  total  allowances  were  over-allocated,  and 
Anderson and Di Maria (2011) estimated that 6% of free allowances were over-allocated.
Notably, the Commission had imposed a 4,6% reduction of allocations in the initial submissions of 
NAPs (Venmans, 2012, p. 5497). For Phase 2, the Commission was able to impose more stringent 
allocation  caps  during  revisions  of  NAPs  and  thus  address  the  problem  of  over-allocation 
(Egenhofer, 2007). 
Over-allocation is apparently a generic problem for ET systems that base allocation on emissions 
projections.  Grubb  and  Ferrario  (2006) assembled  evidence  that  showed  that  sector  emissions 
projections in emission trading systems are uncertain; but in addition they found clear evidence that  
these projections have a clear upward bias of about 1% per year, cumulative. In this respect the EU 
during the first two phases of the EU ETS forewent an opportunity to shield the allocation process 
from the  detrimental  dynamic  discussed  in  the  previous  paragraphs  that  non-transnational  ET 
systems do not have—namely the opportunity to establish the allocation authority at a supranational 
level. 
EU ETS industry would  have  been expected  to  seek  to  reduce  costs  induced  by ET,  and  this 
discussion suggests that it managed to do so by contributing to establishing a decentralised system 
of setting allocation caps. Even with the Commissions authority to order changes in NAPs, this 
42 An indication that this recurred in Phase 2 is found in an official UK report: «As most companies have received 
allocations broadly in line with their BAU emission projections for the period 2008-2012, any decrease in 
production will lead to emissions being lower than the allocations of allowances they received» (Davies, Lewis, & 
Thomas, 2009, p. 6). 
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system  was  less  conducive  to  stringent  allowance  caps,  firstly,  because  it  produced  strategic 
behaviour from national authorities; and secondly, because it created an asymmetric situation in 
which industry was able to negotiate generous allocations from national authorities. 
Many of the countries that did over-allocate43 had scope to do so.  Whereas the EU-15 burden-
sharing agreement determined the QELRCs of EU-15 Member States, new EU members were given 
QELRCs in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol targets. Most former USSR countries entered the 
First  Commitment  Period  under  the  Kyoto  Protocol  significantly  below their  respective  Kyoto 
targets44 45(European  Environment  Agency,  2012a).  Consequently  they  were  able  to  allocate 
generously without concern about Kyoto targets—to the extent that the Commission allowed it—
and subsequently sell EUAs to EU-15 Member States with more stringent commitments46. Hence 
the EU ETS also became a vehicle for a substantial intra-EU wealth transfer from west to east: EU-
15 bought EUAs to the tune of 700 million euros from EU-12 to cover for 40 million tonnes (Mt) 
CO2e only in 2005 and 2006 (Convery et al., 2008).
4.3 Windfall profits from free allocation 
During Phase 1 it became evident that the power generating sector was able to pass on a substantial 
share of the notional cost of allowances to consumers. This prompted in particular companies from 
energy-intensive industry to protest (Ellerman & Buchner, 2007, p. 73). The profits that were passed 
through to consumers were real and have been documented; Sijm, Bakker, Chen, Harmsen, and Lise 
(2005) found that in the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and France, between 40% and 70% of the 
value  of  the  freely  allocated  allowances  were  passed  through  and  paid  by  consumers.  Sijm, 
Neuhoff, and Chen  (2006) later found that, in the Netherlands and Germany, the corresponding 
numbers  were  between  60  to  100%.  The  Commission  also  has  acknowledged  that  the  power 
generation sector was able to do this in the first two phases of the EU ETS (European Commission, 
2013a) 
In countries which had achieved a low degree of liberalisation of the power sector, the pass-through 
of allowance prices was less problematic than in other parts. If electricity companies are under state 
43 See Convery et al (2008).
44 The Kyoto targets of the EU-12 were set out in a Commission Decision (2010a).
45 The former USSR countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2008 generally experienced very large reductions in 
national GHG emissions in the first few years after 1990 as a consequence of comprehensive changes to their 
economies after the Collapse of Communism in 1989. When the Kyoto Protocol was agreed on, most of these 
countries were therefore far below their respective Kyoto targets. 
46 In addition, EU-12 Member States had the opportunity to sell Kyoto credits in parallel. 
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control,  their  profits  ultimately accrue to  the public.  However,  in  countries such as the Nordic 
countries, which compared to EU countries on the continent had a very liberalised electricity market 
by 2005 (Ellerman & Joskow, 2008, p. 26), profits from the allowance cost electricity price hike 
were largely passed through to investors  (Fell,  2008),  even though the  low-carbon intensity of 
power production in Norway and Sweden in particular probably contributed to somewhat lower 
pass-through costs for Nordic consumers (see Lise, Sijm, & Hobbs, 2010).
The UK also had a relatively liberalised power sector by 2005 (Ellerman & Joskow, 2008, p. 26), 
and there the pass-through to consumers entailed that private power companies made huge profits to 
little or no social benefit. The extent to which this happened worried for example British policy-
makers; in 2006 the UK Department for Trade and Industry reported that in the UK six large energy 
generators had recorded a yearly 800 million pound increase in profits as a result of the introduction 
of the EU ETS (Wettestad, 2008, p. 8). 
Other estimates of the windfall profits in the EU ETS power sector vary, but agree that that power 
generators in sum raked in several billion euros a year in Phases 1 and 2 because of free allocation.  
Sijm (2007) estimated that power generators got windfall profits of between 24 and 35 billion euros 
yearly in 2005-2006 because of the EU ETS47. The lion share of these profits—between 18 and 20 
billion euros—was attributed to free allocation specifically. Point Carbon's (2008) estimate that as a 
result of free allocation power generators in the UK, Spain, Germany, Italy, and Poland raked in 
between 23 and 71 billion euros48 during Phase 2 (2008-2011) has been frequently cited. 
While the pass-through of costs of emitting GHGs by power generators to consumers—who are the 
ultimate cause of emissions—were welcomed on environmental grounds (Convery, 2009), by the 
time the EU ETS was reformed in 2009 there was a general consensus in political circles that the 
windfall profits that had accrued to the power generators in the two first phases because of free 
allocation, needed to be eliminated.
47 Estimates were made by using the extended EU20 COMPETES model.
48 The wide range of the estimate is partly explained by uncertain data and a carbon price of either 21 or 32 euros per 
tCO2. 
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4.4 New entrant and closure provisions
Free allocation also created problems related to provisions for new entrants and closures. The legal 
framework for the EU ETS gave member countries considerable discretion regarding the treatment 
of new entrants and closures. This resulted in practices which differed significantly from country to 
country. The variation shaped an uneven playing field for emitters entering and exiting the scheme. 
By the issuing of the guidance document for Phase 2 NAPs, the Commission judged it premature to 
identify best practices, but encouraged simpler and more transparent NAPs (European Commission, 
2005).  All  EU ETS member countries reserved allowances for new entrants,  but the manner in 
which, and the extent to which this was done, varied. For closures, the general practice was to 
withdraw the allowances. Because this is tantamount to subsidising the emitters that do not close 
down,  it  gives  them  an  advantage,  and  incentivises  a  continuation  of  polluting  activities.  An 
unfortunate  aspect  of  that  is  that  it  effectively prevents  modernisation  and replacement  of  old 
polluting facilities with newer and more efficient ones (Åhman, Burtraw, Kruger, & Zetterberg, 
2006). 
Yet  it  would still  be problematic  if  closures were able to retain their  allowances,  which would 
constitute a windfall profit for those operators who would then be able to sell their allowances upon 
closure, making it more attractive to relocate49. A regime based upon pure auctioning of allowances 
would not have given rise to these concerns.
In  the  energy  generating  sector,  the  majority  of  EU  ETS  member  countries  allocated  more 
allowances to carbon-intensive energy producers than they allocated to less carbon-intensive energy 
producers, reflecting a policy of using past emissions rather than output to calculate the allocation 
of allowances. Analyses of the treatment of new entrants and closures reveal that high-emitting 
installations have an advantage over low-emitting ones (Wråke, 2009, pp. 12-13). Consequently, 
incentives to develop and shift to low-carbon technologies were reduced. Significantly, the policy 
was applied to new entrants and closures as well—the candidates most likely to take such measures. 
Again,  if  auctioning had been preferred as  method of  allocation instead  of  free allocation,  the 
undermining of the main purpose of ET—incentivising a shift to less carbon-intensive technologies
—would not have happened. 
49 This takes for granted that closures are not considered a desirable abatement option by the national governments 
involved.
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4.5 EUA spot price development
Because allowances could not be banked and used in subsequent phases, the demand and hence the 
price of EUAs was influenced by economic growth, weather conditions, relative energy prices and 
marginal abatement costs (Convery et al., 2008). The EUA price started out at around 7 euros and 
then gradually rose toward reaching a historical maximum of almost 30 euros in April 2006 (see 
figure 2). The increase was driven by rising natural gas prices that induced a switch to coal-driven 
electricity generation, which in turn increased emissions (European Environment Agency, 2012b, p. 
48). While unexpectedly high EUA prices from mid-2005 increased abatement incentives among 
emitters,  they also  served  to  underline  the  distributional  impacts  of  the  EU ETS,  which  were 
enhanced. Thus the windfall profits that accrued to power generators because of free allocation gave 
rise to public debate and concern at the political level about the efficiency and legitimacy of the EU 
ETS (Wettestad, 2008). 
After having reached a high point in late April 2006, the EUA spot price collapsed by over 50% in 
the course of four days after announcements by The Netherlands, the Czech Republic, the Walloon 
region of Belgium, and France that emissions were significantly below allocations, in addition to an 
announcement by Spain that it had a smaller shortage than expected. The EUA price then stabilised 
around 15 euros for a few months, until late September 2006, when it started to slide inexorably 
towards zero, as it became increasingly apparent that weather and other factors would not create 
additional demand for EUAs (Ellerman & Buchner, 2008). As figure 2 shows, the EUA was nearly 
worthless from mid-2007.  
49
Figure 3. EUA spot price history
The 2006 EUA spot price crash and the subsequent  slide towards  zero clearly undermined the 
efficiency of the EU ETS by substantially reducing abatement incentives. Given that banking of 
allowances generally was not an option, the combination of uncertain emissions data and BAU 
projections with relatively unambitious emissions reductions targets proved lethal for the EUA price 
(Egenhofer, 2007). 
Due to the non-transferability of EUAs between Phases 1 and 2, the spot price jumped to over 20 
euros at the start of Phase 2, and in mid-2008 it almost reached the historical high the EUA rose to 
in 2006. However, the financial crisis that unravelled in late 2008 produced a recession in 2008-
2009 which reduced demand significantly (Parker, 2010, p. 4), sending the EUA price well below 
10 euros in early 2009. Thereafter the economy recovered somewhat from the financial crisis during 
2009, and pressed the EUA price upwards to around 15 euros. It stabilised roughly at that level until 
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2011, during which primarily a renewed cyclical downturn pushed the price down towards 5 euros 
at the end of the year (NOU 2012: 16, p. 134). Throughout 2012 the spot price fluctuated between 5 
and 10 euros.  With the entry into Phase 3 more allowances were available,  and the price sank 
further and stayed mostly between 3 and 5 euros in the first half of 2013. 
The reason why the  EUA price  did  not  fall  further  was clearly related  to  the  decision  by the 
Commission (2010b) to allow for banking of allowances from Phase 2 to Phase 3. It is widely 
believed that there was a considerable surplus of allowances in Phase 2; in a leaked draft of the 
2050 roadmap the Commission (2011d) estimated that between 500-800 million allowances would 
be surplus and banked to Phase 350. Whereas the possibility to bank allowances shored up the EUA 
price at the end of Phase 2, it also depressed the price in the beginning of Phase 3. 
The mentioned surplus of allowances in Phase 2 seems to be the result of the economic crisis rather 
than over-allocation. Certainly the Phase 2 cap seemed relatively stringent prior to the financial 
crisis (see Egenhofer, 2007). That arguably reflected the benefits of the experience accumulated in 
Phase 1, which included sound verified emissions data despite continued reliance upon uncertain 
BAU projections. Thus, even if Phase 2 evidenced serious systemic flaws as well, improvements in 
allocation implied that Phase 1 at least to some extent served its purpose of learning-by-doing. 
4.6 Assessing abatement
The monumental resources which have been committed to the EU ETS beg the question of what 
impact the EU ETS has had on emissions. But the intricacy of international economics and modern 
governance means that assessing the impact of the EU ETS on emissions is difficult. Polluters  in 
EU ETS sectors are influenced by a very complex economic and regulatory reality in which a 
wealth of factors may affect their behaviour, and to disentangle the effect of those factors from that 
of the EU ETS is only possible to an extent.
To identify a few of the most important factors, firstly, the level of growth and investment in the 
sectors of the economy in question clearly influence emissions. Secondly, fossil fuel prices affect 
emissions  in  a  variety of  ways  including through production  and transportation  costs.  Thirdly, 
international  competitiveness  in  the  sectors  concerned  influences  emissions,  and  the  former  is 
influenced  by  many  factors,  one  of  which  is  international  exchange  rates.  Affecting  all  the 
aforementioned factors is the overall global economic climate. On the regulatory side there is inter 
50 The estimate did not appear in the final version of the Communication (European Commission, 2011a)
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alia the challenge of distinguishing the impact of the EU ETS from other environmental policies, 
such as the climate and energy package and the Energy Efficiency Directive (European Parliament 
and the Council, 2012).
One straightforward way of assessing the impact of the EU ETS would be to compare verified 
emissions  with  projected  emissions  according  to  allocations  in  Phase  1  and  2.  However,  the 
resulting estimates would be inaccurate for obvious reasons. BAU projections on which Phase 1 
allocations were made were too high, as previously discussed. And the economic crisis which cast a 
long shadow over Phase 2 made economic growth and hence emissions, lower than expected. 
The lack of credible BAU projections implies that they need to be generated in studies that estimate 
EU ETS-induced abatement. Convery (2009) and Laing et al. (2013) have observed that the analysis 
of abatement in the scholarly literature is weakened by a lacking discussion and agreement about 
credible counter-factuals which are necessary in order to produce a sound estimate of the impact of 
the EU ETS. 
 
Notwithstanding the mentioned challenges,  Convery et  al.  (2008) emphasised two observations 
which indicate that the EU ETS led to some abatement in 2005-2006. The first is that real output in 
the EU in this  period increased at  a  relatively robust  rate.  And the second is  that  EU verified 
emissions  in 2005-2006 were lower than EU emissions in 2002-2004, «even after  allowing for 
plausible upward bias in the pre-2005 data» (p. 17). Since historical rates of improvement of energy 
and CO2 efficiency indicated that emissions should have increased, or at least remained at the 2002-
2004 levels, the authors concluded that the evidence indicated that the EU ETS had led to some 
abatement. 
Ellerman  and  Buchner  (2008) argued  that  the  EU  ETS  produced  substantial  abatement,  and 
estimated it to be between 50 and 100 MtCO2e yearly in 2005-2006. Anderson and Maria produced 
a somewhat higher abatement estimate of 247 MtCO2e in total during Phase 1. The majority of 
Phase 1 abatement estimates are in agreement with that of Ellerman and Buchner, estimating EU 
ETS-induced abatement to be between -2,5 and -5%  in Phase 1 (Venmans, 2012).
As mentioned, Ellerman and Buchner (2008) also calculated that 6% of allowances were over-
allocated,  but  underlined  that  over-allocation  and  abatement  could  both  occur  in  Phase  1. 
Importantly,  the market  could not  know about  the over-allocation until  verified emissions were 
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reported. But as the market became aware of it, over-allocation together with non-transferability of 
allowances to Phase 2 gradually destroyed the value of EAUs. Hence Convery et al (2008) argued 
that little abatement likely happened in 2007. Delarue et al (2008) estimated abatement of nearly 90 
MtCO2e in 2005 and nearly 60 MtCO2e in 2006 in the power sector. Given the EUA price crash in 
April 2006, the estimated decline in abatement in 2006 supports the argument that little abatement 
likely occurred in 2007. 
Without LULUCF, EU-15 emissions in 2011 were 14,9% below base year levels. EU-15 is therefore 
comfortably on course to  achieve  its  common Kyoto commitment  to  achieve an 8% reduction 
compared to base year levels in 2008-201251 52; and the EU-12 Member States were also on course 
to  compliance  (European  Environment  Agency,  2013).  However,  the  final  Kyoto  compliance 
assessment will not be possible before late 2014 or early 2015 (European Environment Agency, 
2012b, p. 21)
Studies of the effect of the EU ETS are mostly focusing on Phase 1. Laing et al (2013) suggested 
the  reason  for  this  is  that  the  financial  crisis  complicates  the  task  of  establishing  credible 
econometric  counter-factuals.  There  is  of  course  also  a  time-lag  in  emissions  reporting  which 
implies that it is premature to draw conclusions on the impact of EU ETS in Phase 2.
However, Laing et al (2013, p. 9) cited reports that “seem to indicate” that EU emissions reductions 
since the EU ETS came into operation are to a greater extent caused by the economic downturn than 
EU ETS-induced abatement. But that does not exclude significant EU ETS-induced abatement also 
in Phase 2. While the question if any abatement occurred in the last couple of years of Phase 2 when 
the economy took a turn for the worse is still unanswered, the authors cited two studies (Abrell et 
al., 2011; Egenhofer et al., 2011) focusing on 2008-2009 which both showed stronger abatement in 
that period than in 2005-2006, suggesting that the EU ETS induced more emissions reductions in 
Phase 2 than in Phase 1. 
The overall picture is therefore that the EU ETS induced some abatement during part of Phase 1, 
before the EUA price collapsed; and probably also in 2008-2009. Some credit for this should be laid 
at the door of the Commission, which slashed initial submissions of NAP allowance caps by 4,6%, 
and corresponding submissions for Phase 2 by 10,4% (Venmans, 2012). However, the ability of the 
51 EU-27 does not have a common commitment for 2008-2012 like the EU-15 has. 
52 Italy and Spain were however not on track to achieve their targets individually, which is required for the EU-15 to 
achieve its target. Their compliance can nevertheless be ensured by purchase of Kyoto credits. 
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EU ETS to cause abatement has been significantly undermined by over-allocation and the financial 
crisis. 
 
4.7 EU ETS and incentives to shift to low-carbon strategies
Beyond relatively cheap abatement options such as fuel-switching, the EU ETS can cause limited 
abatement without a perception that it incentivises a fundamental shift to low-carbon strategies. The 
chronically low carbon price throughout most of the EU ETS lifespan is a reason for questioning if 
it has been able to do this. While the EUA spot price was well over 20 euros for a considerable 
period in Phase 1 and in the first year of Phase 2, it fluctuated between 10 and 15 euros for most of 
Phase 2, before dropping below 10 euros in 2011. After that happened, there has been a general 
perception that the price has been too low to provide incentives for investment in green technology 
(The Economist, 2012a; Øvrebø, 2013).  
Some research indicates that the EU ETS so far to a very limited degree has triggered a shift to low-
carbon strategies, which involve long-term abatement options. Research done by Climate Strategies 
(K Neuhoff,  2011) during 2010 gives an interesting insight into how businesses considered the 
incentives related to the EU ETS. “Many” companies reported that climate policy continued to be a 
less  important  factor  in  investment  decisions;  and  40%  of  companies  told  that  the  Phase  2 
stringency allowed them to continue BAU. In addition, the majority considered that the current 20% 
reduction target is not sufficient to trigger a shift to low-carbon strategies (p. 5).
Another study with a different approach (Calel & Dechezlepretre, 2012) looked at the number of 
low-carbon patents filed to the European Patent Office by a dataset of EU ETS companies and 
comparable non-EU ETS companies between 2000 and 2009. Before 2005 the two groups had very 
similar patent activity levels. Measured as a share of all patents filed in per cent, EU ETS firms 
started with less than 1% in 2005, and increased to about 2% in 2009. Non-EU ETS firms started 
with over 3% in 2005, and increased to about 8% in 2009. Although the shares rose with a similar 
multiple, the data suggests that non-EU ETS firms were more committed to low-carbon innovation 
than  EU  ETS  counterparts.  The  authors  of  the  research  could  not  identify  what  caused  this 
particular pattern; only that rising low-carbon innovation was not caused by the EU ETS. 
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4.8 The use of flexible mechanisms
Ten EU-15 Member States53 have reported their intention to use flexible mechanisms to comply 
with their individual and common obligation under the Kyoto Protocol for 2008-2012. These plans 
involved the purchase of an amount of credits equivalent to 84 million euros per annum during 
Phase 2, which corresponds to 2% of base year emissions. The EU-15 had allocated 2890 million 
euros to that end (European Environment Agency, 2012b, p. 29), but the amount might have to be 
increased to cover the planned purchase of credits (p. 32).
The idea behind the use of flexible mechanisms for EU ETS compliance is partly that they reduce 
emissions  where it  is  cheapest  to  do so—after  all  addressing  climate change requires  a  global 
solution.  But use of such credits in the EU ETS weakened the EUA price because of the huge 
oversupply of international credits that particularly was evident towards the end of Phase 2 (The 
Economist, 2012b). 
A perhaps more significant problem with the use of such credits was that they did not necessarily 
reflect implementation of “real” emissions cuts—that is, cuts in emissions which would have been 
produced regardless.  Wara  and Victor  (2008) documented  that  generation  of  CERs from  CHF3 
capture was far more valuable than the production of the refrigerant gas that CHF3 supposedly was 
a by-product of. Given that  CHF3 has a GWP of 11700 and was cheap to capture, such projects 
mushroomed.  This  perverse  incentive  transformed  refrigerant  manufacturers  into  waste  CHF3 
manufacturers and contributed to the huge oversupply in the international carbon credit market. 
According to the authors, payments to parties who profited from this manufacturing would end up 
totalling 4,7 billion euros, whereas the real abatement costs were estimated at about 100 million 
euros (pp. 11-12).
Since the oversupply of Kyoto credits  undermined the EUA price and since large quantities of 
CERs that did not represent real reductions of emissions were generated, the use of these credits in 
the  EU ETS clearly weakened  the  scheme's  efficiency54.  The  Commission  decision  (2011c) to 
prohibit the use of credits from CHF3 destruction in Phase 3 is indicative of this. 
53 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
54 Additional doubts about the efficiency of the flexible mechanisms have been expressed (see Wara & Victor, 2008).
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4.9 Aviation
The 2008 directive (European Parliament and the Council) which included aviation in the EU ETS 
and demanded 15% auctioning, was temporarily hampered by the decision (European Parliament 
and the Council, 2013) to derogate the enforcement of the EU ETS on international flights for the 
year  2012. The EU  felt  that  progress  had  been  made  recently  in  the  ICAO  toward  a  global 
framework for emissions control policies in aviation, and this decision was made so as to «facilitate 
this progress and provide momentum» (p. 1) ahead of the ICAO General Assembly in the autumn 
2013. However, as the  European Low Fares Airline Association has argued (Greenair, 2013), the 
exemption of the vast majority of EU ETS aviation  CO2 emissions renders the regulation of the 
aviation sector completely inefficient—for the time being.  
EU ETS regulation of the aviation sector has started poorly, and while the current provisions impose 
relatively  small  cuts  on  CO2 emissions  from  aviation,  projections  of  future  global  aviation 
emissions—estimated  to  increase  by  300-700%  by  2050  (European  Commission,  2013g)—
emphasise the need for stringent emissions controls on the aviation sector. It should also be noted 
that  only  restricting  CO2 emissions  is  insufficient  since  other  impacts  from aviation  than  CO2 
emissions that increase radiative forcing and cause global warming, significantly surpass the effects 
of CO2 emissions (European Parliament and the Council, 2008, pp. 5-6).
4.10 Phase 3 and future prospects for the EU ETS
Phase 3 introduced structural changes to the EU ETS that improved its efficiency in several ways, 
including  increased  auctioning,  which  will  create  revenues  than  can  be  recycled,  as  well  as 
eliminate windfall profits (from free allocation) in the power generating sector. And the application 
of benchmarks to qualify for full free allocation is another improvement which will incentivise 
operators to increase efficiency. But these and other improvements are largely overshadowed by a 
combination of access to flexible mechanism credits and credits banked from Phase 2; the continued 
economic depression; and complementary environmental policies such as the climate and energy 
package and the EED Directive,  which have conspired to dictate a very weak allowance price, 
which severely weakens the efficiency of the EU ETS (see Caisse des Dépôts, 2013).
The  current  low EUA price  reflects  an  oversupply of  allowances  which  is  expected  to  persist 
throughout Phase 3 and spill  over into Phase 4. Deutsche Bank forecast an oversupply of 1.26 
billion allowances by 2020 (Commodities Now, 2012).
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A low EUA price is bad not only because it fails to incentivise abatement by investment in green 
technology, but also because coal-fired power plants are more able to compete with gas-fired power 
plants, which causes emissions to increase. As the EU ETS was about to enter Phase 3, Commission 
Director-General for Climate Action, Jos Delbeke, expressed concern about the low EUA price as 
coal  consumption once again was on the rise  in  Europe,  after  a  long period of decline.  These 
concerns  made  the  Commission  propose  so-called  “back-loading”,  or  postponement,  of  EUAs 
scheduled for auctioning in the first couple of years of Phase 3 (Øvrebø, 2013). But the short-term 
fix was rejected by the EP in April 2013 (Harvey & Vaughan, 2013), and left the EU ETS in need of 
reform. 
Without LULUCF, EU-27 emissions decreased 18,4% between 1990 and 2011. The implication of 
this is that EU-27 had almost reached its 2020 objective, which is a 20% reduction. But it should be  
noted that the climate and energy package included a unilateral  commitment by the EU which 
differs in some ways from the Kyoto 2020 commitment. The EU has legally binding legislation 
which  requires  it  to  achieve  an  average reduction  in  Phase  3  of  20% below  1990  level.  The 
unilateral  goal also includes international aviation and excludes the use of LULUFC. For these 
reasons the numbers are not directly comparable; the EU is a little further away from its reduction 
target  than  the  UNFCCC submission  suggests.  Furthermore,  it  also  remains  to  be  seen  how a 
potential economic recovery could increase emissions. 
But the general consensus is that structural measures are needed to strengthen the EU ETS, and the 
EU held two public consultation meetings during the first half of 2013 to generate discussion about 
policy options. The perception in recent years that allowance surplus and low prices have damaged 
the efficiency of the EU ETS has triggered many recommendations that the EU should increase the 
abatement burden on the EU ETS. Whereas it before the entry into Phase 3 was suggested that the 
EU should increase the 2020 reduction target to 30%55, more recent suggestions tend to consider 
alternative options, such as establishing a binding post-2020 target56. 
The prolonged economic crisis is an extraordinary event, but revealed an inability on behalf of the 
EU ETS to adapt to such events; and a need for more flexibility in the future. One way to marry the 
ET mantra of regulatory stability with flexibility, can be found in the Australian ETS, which will  
55 See for instance D'Oultremont (2010), and Point Carbon (2009).
56 See for instance Caisse des Dépôts (2013), Laing et al (2013), K Neuhoff (2011), Kollmuss and Lazarus (2010), 
Commodities Now (2012), and Øvrebø (2013).  
57
have a fixed five-year emissions cap that is updated and fixed five years in advance with a long-
term reduction target in mind (Egenhofer, Marcu, & Georgiev, 2012, p. 18). Considering the huge 
problems the economic crisis created for the EU ETS recently and the fact that businesses would 
favour  a  stable  allowance price,  there  is  reason to  believe  that  a  similar  mechanism could  be 
introduced into the ETS Directive by Phase 4.
The framework for use of credits from the flexible mechanisms is currently under review. More 
restrictions would increase the efficiency of the EU ETS. The continued use of the CDM and JI in  
the EU ETS is questionable in that respect as it for instance can be argued that a large number of the 
projects  that  qualify  for  participation  in  this  framework  would  have  been  completed  without 
financial  support,  and that alternative,  cheaper  mechanisms could be used instead to  encourage 
clean development in developing countries (see Wara & Victor, 2008). 
A reform of the EU ETS in the short-term depends to a great extent on if an international climate 
agreement  materialises,  and what  it  will  look like.  The EU ETS will  necessarily reflect  a  new 
climate agreement. However, a legally binding agreement is not to be expected, according to Jos 
Delbeke  (Øvrebø,  2013).  The  hurdles  that  must  be  overcome  in  order  to  conclude  such  an 
agreement suggest that it is not imminent. However, countries that for years have hindered progress, 
such as the US and China, are moving in the right direction (Flannery, Beale, & Hueston, 2012). 
A pivotal concern for the EU is the possibility of increased carbon leakage if a more stringent 
regime is  imposed unilaterally  by the  EU.  Thus  a  key element  of  a  new international  climate 
agreement will be the implementation of an international framework which prevents carbon leakage
—but that will arguably require a relatively broad agreement. Meanwhile, building on the Phase 3 
inclusion of the aluminium sector57 and the revision of state aid rules, targeted policies that mitigate 
the effects that produce carbon leakage may contribute to EU agreement to unilaterally increase its 
reduction target in the future. 
But such an agreement would very unlikely revise the 2020 target (Egenhofer et al., 2012, p. 11). 
Reopening the ETS Directive would not only be difficult politically, but it would also be time-
consuming and would not eliminate the allowance surplus in a short period of time (M. Grubb, 
57 The inclusion of the aluminium sector in the EU ETS in Phase 3 was a positive step for the scheme's efficiency to 
the extent that it induces abatement without simultaneously causing significant carbon leakage. With the expiration 
of long term electricity supply contracts in 2010 for 65% of the European aluminium production capacity, the sector 
suddenly to a much larger degree thence became exposed to a new reality in which electricity prices to a large extent 
include EUA costs (Convery et al., 2008, p. 21).
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2012; Øvrebø, 2013). Therefore a post-2020 target, for instance a 2030 target, is a more realistic 
possibility. 
And EU Member States have strong incentives to adopt a more demanding binding target beyond 
2020. The current 1,74% annual reduction puts the EU on a trajectory which will lead to reductions 
of  only 51% by 2050 for  total  EU emissions,  far  below the 80-95% commitment  in  the  2050 
Roadmap (K Neuhoff, 2011). Since much of the investment required for a comprehensive shift to a 
low-carbon  economy is  on  a  time-scale  of  decades,  a  credible  long-term incentive  is  essential 
(Laing et al., 2013, p. 11). For every year this shift is delayed, emissions reductions to stop global 
warming beyond 2 degrees  Celsius  will  be  several  hundred  billion US dollars  more  expensive 
globally (D'Oultremont, 2010, p. 44).
Nonetheless, if no international agreement materialises and the ongoing debt crisis continues to 
depress the EU economy, agreement to commit to a binding post-2020 target may still take years to 
achieve,  especially  because  of  the  unwillingness  of  new  Eastern  Member  States  to  agree  to 
unilateral action (D'Oultremont, 2010, p. 44). 
4.11 Conclusions
Phase 1 was considered a trial period, so expectations were not as high as for Phase 2. Particular 
Phase 1 problems included poor emissions data and BAU projections, which contributed to over-
allocation along with the tight time schedule.  Decentralised determination of national allocation 
caps also facilitated over-allocation in Phase 1 by producing a prisoners dilemma, whereby Member 
States could benefit from inflating their allocation caps—and be disadvantaged if they did not.
Several of the factors which undermined the efficiency of the EU ETS in Phases 1 and 2 were 
related to the widespread use of free allocation. It produced windfall profits of several billion euros 
annually through Phases 1 and 2 in the power generating sector. It also created perverse incentives 
for  new  entrants  and  closures  by  subsidising  polluting  manufacturing  and  disincentivising 
investment in less carbon-intensive production.
A consistently  low  EUA price  undermined  the  overarching  goal  of  the  scheme,  which  is  to 
incentivise abatement in an effective manner. After an unexpectedly high EUA spot price initially, it 
completely collapsed during 2006 as the market became aware of over-allocation, and was near zero 
by mid-2007. The price crash was caused by over-allocation and the inability to transfer allowances 
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to Phase 2. In Phase 2 the financial crisis that unravelled in 2008 substantially depressed emissions 
and hence EAU prices. The price fluctuated between 10 and 15 euros for most of the period, but 
sank well below 10 euros from late 2011. Allowances were transferable between Phases 2 and 3, so 
the price kept a stable, but downward trajectory into Phase 3, due to a large surplus of allowances. 
Assessing  EU  ETS-induced  abatement  is  notoriously  difficult  because  of  the  challenge  of 
distinguishing  the  effects  of  a  complex  web  of  interrelated  factors  that  influence  emissions. 
However, scholars agree that the EU ETS caused a modest amount of abatement during 2005-2006, 
equivalent to a reduction in emissions of between 2,5 and 5% in Phase 1. Much less research has 
been conducted on Phase 2 abatement, but some research indicates that the EU ETS caused slightly 
more abatement in 2008-2009 than in 2005-2006. It should be noted that these two periods were the 
ones with relatively high EUA prices; and the common perception is that lower prices induces less 
abatement. There is moreover a general agreement that an EUA price below 10 Euro—which has 
been the case since late 2011—is insufficient to induce abatement. 
Some research suggests that the allowance cost has so far been too low to trigger a shift to low-
carbon strategies, and that EU ETS sector companies do not distinguish themselves from the rest in 
terms of low-carbon innovation. 
For Phase 2 compliance EU-15 Member States had allocated 2980 billion euros to buy ERUs and 
CERs. However, there is evidence that the flexible mechanisms have created perverse incentives, 
and there are additional doubts about their efficiency. Moreover, the huge oversupply in recent years 
of  the credits  they generate  have  pushed the price of  EUAs downwards,  hence  weakening the 
efficiency of the EU ETS. The use of these credits have been subject to some restrictions in Phase 3, 
and the rules for their use are currently under revision.  
Several  structural  changes  that  improved  the  EU ETS'  efficiency were  introduced  in  Phase  3. 
However, they look set to be overshadowed by an allowance price that is too low to incentivise 
abatement. Unless measures are taken, the oversupply of allowances will persist throughout Phase 3 
and spill over into Phase 4. The EU may introduce a mechanism by Phase 4 which will give the EU 
ETS more flexibility in the future to adjust to extraordinary events such as the financial crisis.  
However, it will in any event be necessary to increase the abatement burden to make the EU work 
efficiently. If an international climate agreement is concluded, the EU ETS will be revised. If it does 
not materialise in the near future, and if the EU economy continues to suffer, it may take several 
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years before EU Member States can agree on a post-2020 target.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
The first objective of this paper was to explain why the EU ETS was set up. Chapter 1 details how 
an  acknowledgement  that  concerted  global  action  was  needed  to  prevent  dangerous  human 
intervention  with  the  climate  system led  to  the  signing  of  the  UNFCCC in  1992.  Developed 
countries took primary responsibility to act, which they legally committed themselves to do in the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997. 
After  a  carbon tax  was deemed politically unviable in  the early 1990s,  around the turn  of  the 
millennium ET emerged as the EU policy-mechanism of choice to lower EU GHG emissions. The 
resulting ET Directive of 2003 stipulated that the EU ETS would be working from 2005. That 
would give the parties involved opportunity to improve the performance of the scheme prior to 
entering Phase 2 (2008-2012), which coincided with the First Commitment Period of the Kyoto 
Protocol, wherein the EU-15 Member States had committed themselves jointly to achieve an 8% 
reduction in GHG emissions compared to base year levels.   
In chapter 2, the first answers to why the EU ETS has developed into an inefficient mechanism to 
lower  GHG emissions  are  found in  the  political  economy which  dictated  the  premises  for  the 
making of the ET Directive. The scholarly literature and the Commission favoured auctioning of 
allowances and centrally set allocation caps, and inter alia warned that free allocation would create 
perverse incentives for new entrants and closures, and underlined the positive potential of recycling 
revenues from auctioning of allowances. In addition, although policy-makers did not appear to have 
taken note of this, the scholarly literature had predicted windfall profits from free allocation in the 
power sector. 
Nevertheless, stakeholder industry and Member States forced through free allocation of allowances 
and decentralised setting of allocation caps. Stakeholder industry wanted these features due to rent-
seeking motives, and Member State authorities were concerned about and susceptible to worries 
expressed  by  the  former  that  auctioning  and  centralised  setting  of  caps  would  damage  the 
competitiveness of national industries. The latter wanted free allocation because it involved the least 
cost. As for decentralised setting of caps, the parties also favoured that particular design because of 
the possibility that a centrally set cap might disadvantage their intra-Community competitiveness as 
well. In addition, industry plausibly anticipated that this structure would facilitate over-allocation, 
thereby making the scheme less costly for them. 
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Several factors indicate that stakeholder industry had a crucial influence on the decision to opt for 
free allocation in the EU ETS, including past experiences with ET; the policy-making process; 
studies on the impact of lobbyism on environmental legislation in Germany; and the susceptibility 
of  politicians  to  concerns  about  negative  effects  on  the  competitiveness  of  national  industries. 
Energy-intensive industry with high exposure to international competition, such as the steel sector, 
played an important role in convincing politicians that free allocation was necessary to prevent 
carbon leakage. NGOs that were involved in consultations facilitated the outcome by not objecting 
to free allocation per se. 
By the 2009 revision that produced the ETS Directive, the structural inefficiencies related to the 
mentioned features of the EU ETS were so obvious and serious that they inevitably were addressed. 
By Phase 3, a common EU ETS-wide cap was determined on the basis of Phase 2 NAPs. However,  
the  unravelling  of  the  financial  crisis  in  late  2008,  combined  with  a  massive  and coordinated 
lobbying effort by industry, weakened the determination of politicians such as Angela Merkel to 
introduce auctioning across the board; leading to an agreement to auction about 40% of EUAs in the 
first year of Phase 3. 
Chapter  3  highlights  central  facets  of  the  legal  framework  of  the  EU  ETS—  including  the 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol—and important changes made ahead of Phase 3. It thus provides 
basic knowledge which is required to adequately understand how the EU ETS works. Among the 
key changes ahead of Phase 3 was the decision to start to auction about 40% of allowances in the  
first year of Phase 3, and incrementally augment this percentage in subsequent years. The aim is to 
auction all allowances in 2027. Centralised direction of the allocation process was increased and a 
common allocation cap was set to decrease in linear fashion by 1,74% per annum throughout Phase 
3.  This  will  ensure  a  reduction  of  EU ETS GHG emissions  of  21% compared  to  2005 level; 
contributing to achieving the aim of a 20% reduction in total emissions by 2020. Free allocation to 
the  power  sector  was  (nearly)  abolished;  and  full  free  allocation  in  other  sectors  was  made 
conditional on the fulfilment of EU ETS-wide benchmarks. Due to concerns about possible carbon 
leakage,  these  changes  were  accompanied  by a  relaxation  in  state  aid  rules  to  enable  national 
subsidies to cancel unwanted impacts of EUA costs in electricity prices. Aviation was also included 
from 2012, but the application of the EU ETS to other than intra-EU ETS flights was deferred for 
the year 2012 in anticipation of a possible agreement on international aviation emissions controls. 
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Chapter 4 discusses main aspects of the functioning of the EU ETS in terms of efficiency and 
explains  why the  EU ETS has  developed  into  an  inefficient  scheme.  In  Phase  1  decentralised 
determination of allocation caps facilitated over-allocation by producing a prisoners dilemma which 
lead Member States to inflate national allocation caps,  thereby undermining the stringency and 
hence efficiency of the system. 
However, to some extent Phase 1 served its purpose by enabling endogenous sources of inefficient 
performance such as  poor  emissions  data  and over-allocation,  to  be  tackled.  As it  managed to 
impose substantial cuts on NAP allocation caps in both Phase 1 and in Phase 2, the Commission 
was largely responsible for limiting over-allocation.
But inefficiencies inherent in the EU ETS were only tackled to an extent. The continued use of free  
allocation to power generators in Phase 2 produced windfall profits for power generators of several 
billion Euros yearly from 2005 to 2012. Also the continued use of free allocation created perverse 
incentives for new entrants and closures which undermined the efficiency of the scheme. 
Since banking of allowances between Phases 1 and 2 in practice was prohibited, the EUA price 
crashed in 2006 and was near zero by mid-2007, after a high EUA price in the first half of Phase 1. 
More stringent caps also produced a positive EUA price at the start of Phase 2, but as the financial 
crisis  unravelled in  late  2008,  emissions were reduced,  and hence the EUA price.  It  fluctuated 
between 10 and 15 euros during most of the period, before diving below 10 euros in late 2011. Due 
to the possibility of banking allowances, the EUA price kept a stable, but downward trajectory into 
Phase 3, because of a large surplus of allowances. 
In spite of the difficulty of assessing abatement caused by the EU ETS, scholars have agreed that 
the EU ETS induced a moderate amount of abatement in 2005-2006, equivalent to a reduction 
between 2,5  and 5% of  emissions  in  Phase  1.  There  is  currently limited  research  on  Phase  2 
abatement, but some research showed that slightly more abatement was caused by the EU ETS in 
2008-2009 than in 2005-2006. 
But these two periods were the high points of the EUA price, and it is generally presumed that 
lower EUA prices produced less abatement in other years. According to the ET literature, minimal 
abatement occurred in 2007, and the general perception is that an EUA spot price below 10 euros—
which has been the case since late 2011—is too low to induce abatement.
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Some research suggests that the allowance cost has so far been too low to trigger a shift to low-
carbon strategies, and that EU ETS sector companies do not distinguish themselves from the rest in 
terms of low-carbon innovation. 
EU-15 Member States had allocated 2980 billion euros to buy ERUs and CERs for compliance in 
Phase 2. The use of such credits raises questions about efficiency. There is evidence that the flexible 
mechanisms  created  perverse  incentives  and  involved  very  inefficient  abatement.  The  huge 
oversupply of Kyoto credits in recent years has moreover pushed the EUA price downwards, hence 
undermining the efficiency of the EU ETS. 
It is clear that the relatively low EUA price throughout most of the lifespan of the EU ETS has 
rendered the scheme relatively inefficient. The cost associated with emitting GHGs is the incentive 
on which the scheme relies to induce emissions reductions. 
Whereas  over-allocation  initially  undermined  the  EU ETS,  since  2008  the  financial  crisis  has 
severely undermined the  efficiency of  the EU ETS by substantially diminishing emissions  and 
hence demand for allowances. Unfortunately, several structural changes that improved the EU ETS' 
efficiency in Phase 3 on paper will probably be overshadowed by a surplus of allowances that is 
projected to persist throughout Phase 3 and spill over into Phase 4. That will result in an EUA price  
which is too weak to incentivise abatement throughout Phase 3, unless measures are taken. 
Therefore, an inefficient aspect of the EU ETS which has been exposed by the financial crisis, is the 
inability to adjust to extraordinary events. The EU may introduce a mechanism by Phase 4 which 
will give the EU ETS more flexibility in the future to adjust to extraordinary events such as the 
financial crisis. However, it  will in any event be necessary to increase the abatement burden to 
make the EU work efficiently. If an international climate agreement is concluded, the EU ETS will  
be revised. If it does not materialise in the near future, and if the EU economy continues to suffer, it  
may take several years before EU Member States can agree on a post-2020 target. 
 (Buchner, Carraro, & Ellerman, 2006) (K. Neuhoff, Martinez, & Sato, 2006)(un.org)
(Gilbert & Phylipsen, 2006)
European Commission, 2006)
(European Commission, 2013a)
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